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For sustainability, research in operations and supply chain management historically emphasized the
development of environmental rather than social capabilities. However, factory disasters in Bangladesh,
an emerging market and the second largest clothing exporter in the world, revealed enormous chal-
lenges in the implementation of social sustainability in complex global supply chains. Against the
backdrop of a building collapse in Bangladesh's clothing industry, this research uses multiple case studies
from two time periods to explore the skills, practices, relationships and processes e collectively termed
“social management capabilities” (SMCs) e that help buyers and suppliers respond to stakeholder
pressures; address regulatory gaps; and improve social performance. The study not only captures the
perspectives of both multinational buyers and their emerging market suppliers, but also provides sup-
plementary evidence from other key stakeholders, such as NGOs and unions. Our ﬁndings show that, in
the absence of intense stakeholder pressure, buyers can lay the foundation for improved social perfor-
mance by using their own auditors and collaborating with suppliers rather than using third-party au-
ditors. However, in the face of acute attention from customers, NGOs and media, we observed that
consultative buyer-consortium audits emerged, and shared third-party audits offered other advantages
such as increased transparency and improvements in worker education and training. Finally, we present
research propositions derived from our empirical study to guide future research on implementing social
sustainability in emerging markets.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Multinational ﬁrms that source materials, components and
products from emerging markets face increasing scrutiny on the
sustainability of their suppliers for economic, social and environ-
mental performance e referred to as their “triple bottom line.”
Intense examination has arisen for multiple reasons. In the clothing
industry, recent tragedies in Bangladesh have spurred customers,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regulators to
examine the degree to which suppliers in emerging markets follow
socially sustainable practices. For example, the Rana Plaza building
in Bangladesh collapsed in April 2013, killing 1129 people e theF.A. Huq), ilma.chowdhury@
o.ca (R.D. Klassen).
B.V. This is an open access article udeadliest incident in the clothing industry to date. This facility
housed ﬁve clothing suppliers for such international brands as
Primark, Loblaw, and Benetton (Forbes, 2014). Unfortunately, this
disaster followed other large-scale problems in clothing factories
supplying Wal-Mart, Sears and Inditex, the world's largest clothing
retailer (New York Times, 2013).
These repeated social failures - deﬁned here as events that have
a negative impact on the well-being of employees, local commu-
nities or customers - were linked to inadequate attention to safety.
In light of global outsourcing, adverse publicity surrounding such
socially unsustainable practices has caused signiﬁcant damage to
the image of international brands (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).
Not surprisingly, stakeholder attention has increasingly focused on
this and similar industries, and expectations and pressure have
increased on multinational clothing ﬁrms to identify, develop and
implement higher social sustainability standards. For themost part,
these efforts focus on upstream supply chain partners, often locatednder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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high proﬁle brands (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014).
A body of research is slowly developing in supply chain man-
agement (SCM) that addresses sustainability (Pagell and
Shevchenko, 2014); however, much of the research has focused
on environmental issues rather than social ones (Carter and Rogers,
2008; Zorzini et al., 2015). Recently, social sustainability issues have
received growing attention, partly driven by enhanced sensitivity
in developed countries to concerns such as employee pay
inequality (e.g. Fairtrade) or advanced community-oriented pro-
grams (e.g. education and healthcare) (Moxham and Kauppi, 2014;
Marshall et al., 2015). Also, the problem of worker safety in
emerging countries can overshadow issues of employee pay and
environmental protection in developed countries, as evidenced by
recent problems in Bangladesh. Critical gaps remain in our under-
standing of howmultinational ﬁrms might better implement social
sustainability in supply chains that extend to emerging markets, as
well as the capabilities for internal development or external
diffusion of best practices in complex global supply chains (Zorzini
et al., 2015). Multinational ﬁrms must do more than adopt internal
practices: they must ensure the timely implementation of their
own or third-party socially sustainable practices into their
emerging market suppliers.
We use the term social management capabilities (SMCs) to
encompass the skills, practices, relationships, and processes that
enable a ﬁrm to improve its performance on human safety, welfare
and community development (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). In this
paper, we narrow the focus to capabilities that advance social
practices of suppliers in emerging markets. Based on our ﬁeld data,
this construct is multi-dimensional, as it encompasses capabilities
in both multinational buyers and emerging market suppliers.
Moreover, particularly in emerging markets with less effective so-
cial public policies, SMCs also must explicitly consider the nature of
relationships and pressures from other key stakeholders (De Brito
et al., 2008), ranging from unions, to industry associations, to
government agencies and NGOs (Vachon and Klassen, 2006;
Meehan and Bryde, 2011). Stakeholder theory examines how
ﬁrms attend to stakeholder interests and corporate interests
(Mitchell et al., 1997) and guides the development of processes that
address the concerns of groups who have a stake in the business
(Freeman, 2010). For the development of SMCs, thoughtful stake-
holder management is expected to be a key success factor (Ehrgott
et al., 2011; Schneider and Wallenburg, 2012), and we explore how
multiple stakeholders play different roles in the development of
SMCs.
However, stakeholder pressure is not necessarily a uniform,
slowly building (or declining) force over time. Instead, crises and
social failures, such as supplier behavior resulting in the deaths of
workers, can create a sudden impetus for a focal ﬁrm to attempt to
regain legitimacy (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Stakeholders
naturally attribute signiﬁcant responsibility and liability to the focal
ﬁrm for any unsustainable supplier behavior in their supply chains
(Snir, 2001). Yet, relatively little is understood about how such
disruptive events substantively alter the development of social
practices of supply chain partners (Meyer, 1982). To that end, this
paper examines the nature of ﬁrms’ SMCs before and after the Rana
Plaza collapse in Bangladesh.
This study explores two primary research questions: what social
management capabilities (SMCs) are needed in multinational
buyers and their emerging market suppliers; and how do external
factors affect the development and evolution of buyer and supplier
SMCs in emerging markets? Drawing on ﬁeld data from the
clothing industry in Bangladesh, acquired both before and after
recent disasters, this study better deﬁnes the nature of, and
development paths for, multiple capabilities that address socialissues in a complex global supply chain. Three major contributions
emerge. First, based on a synthesis of prior literature, we identify
and assess how SMCs potentially link multinational buyers and
emerging market suppliers. Second, we conducted a two-period
analysis e pre- and post- Rana Plaza collapse, (i.e. 2011e13 and
2013e15) e to explore the evolution of SMCs in Bangladesh during
a period of intense stakeholder pressure when social improvement
and standards were rapidly evolving. Third, by integrating prior
theory with our ﬁeld data, we derived research propositions to
guide future research in emerging markets.2. Literature review
Sustainability for business is often operationalized as the triple
bottom, encompassing environmental, social and economic per-
formance. Environmental sustainability captures resource use and
impact on the physical environment; social sustainability considers
the health and well-being of people in the supply chain and impact
on society (Huq et al., 2014; Marshall et al., 2014). Firms that have
strong sustainability practices in one area may have weak practices
in another. For example, Wal-Mart is known for having stringent,
industry-leading environmental practices in its supply chain, but
the company has been criticized for the treatment of people in its
supply chain (Pfeffer, 2010). Although signiﬁcant insight into the
strategic importance of social sustainability has developed, more
research is needed to understand the capabilities and practices
required to implement social sustainability. In a systematic review
of socially responsible supply chain practices, Zorzini et al. (2015)
point out that the focus of research to date has emphasized a
buyer's demands, with that buyer being located in a developed
nation. We address this important research gap by exploring social
management capabilities (SMCs) in an emerging market context
and by considering the emerging market suppliers' perspectives
and their relationships with multinational buyers.
Social sustainability can be broadly characterized in at least two
ways: avoiding social failures with adverse impact, such as child
labor or loss of life; and improving employee and community
health and welfare. Social failures in the clothing industry have
been in the public eye for decades. For example, retailers like Wal-
Mart and Nike were subjected to media scrutiny in the 1990s
following several sweatshop scandals (Emmelhainz and Adams,
1999). Important insights on the implementation of socially sus-
tainable practices are emerging from the few studies that focus on
the emerging market supplier's perspective. For example, Jiang's
(2009) study into Chinese clothing suppliers discovered that a
buyer's enforcement of its code of conduct (CoC) only encourages
suppliers to undertake “just enough” responsible practices to avoid
being caught. As a result, code of conduct enforcement fails to
signiﬁcantly increase social sustainability over the long term.
However, ﬁrms that shift from threatening non-compliant sup-
pliers to collaborating with them ultimately experience better
compliance. Huq et al. (2014) found that external stakeholder
pressure is an important motivator for emerging market suppliers
and CoCs of multinational buyers oblivious to the cultural and
socio-economic conditions of emerging markets act as barriers to
implementation of socially sustainable practices. Mamic's (2005)
research highlighted the important catalytic role of training and
education of emerging market suppliers by multinational buyers
for achieving social performance objectives. Using these studies as
a starting point, the following section draws on stakeholder theory
and sustainable supply chain management as theoretical founda-
tions for our empirical study focusing on social management
capabilities.
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Previous research indicates that stakeholder pressure plays a
prominent role in the implementation of social standards
(Beschorner and Müller, 2007; Meixell et al., 2015). Stakeholders
are deﬁned as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman,
2010, p. 46). A ﬁrm's operations or supply chain can produce ex-
ternalities, such as pollution or human health problems, that affect
internal stakeholders (employees) and external stakeholders
(members of the surrounding community). Stakeholders pressure
the ﬁrm to reduce negative externalities and increase positive ones
(Zhu and Sarkis, 2007). In the context of international supply
chains, social sustainability typically emphasizes human rights (e.g.
the elimination of child labor and freedom of association), health
and safety (e.g. working conditions and training), and emerging
market communities (e.g. philanthropic initiatives for education).
Good stakeholder management can be a key success factor for
social sustainability (Ehrgott et al., 2011; Schneider and
Wallenburg, 2012) and for overall ﬁrm competitiveness (Harrison
et al., 2010). Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014) categorize stake-
holders into reciprocal stakeholders, who care about fairness, and
self-regarding stakeholders, who do not. A fairness approach to
stakeholder management, where there is an open and honest ex-
change of relevant information and an inclination to resolve
problems through collaboration, leads to value creation from
reciprocal stakeholders. On the other hand, self-regarding stake-
holders are motivated to create value if strong economic incentives
link their contributions closely to personal payoffs. In addition,
Tantalo and Priem (2016) point out that multiple sources of value
creation potentially exist for each type of stakeholder group.
Stakeholder synergy could be created if a ﬁrm works with its
stakeholders such that different types of value increase for two or
more stakeholder groups simultaneously, leading to broader value
creation and increased commitment from stakeholders. However,
in complex emerging markets, little research has investigated the
inﬂuence that speciﬁc stakeholder groups have on suppliers (as
opposed to international buyers). Some stakeholders push buyers
to provide transparent reports on their suppliers, including speciﬁc
names and suppliers' social performance. These supplier reports
are often communicated through annual sustainability reports
(Tate et al., 2010). In parallel, engaging stakeholders can provide
feedback about options to improve supply chain processes (Carter
and Rogers, 2008). For example, some NGOs participate in the
evaluation of multinational buyers’ supply chain sustainability
(Gualandris et al., 2015).
Why must a multinational buyer go to such lengths to manage
social issues in its supply chain when regulation is supposedly in
place? First, multinational buyers frequently source from suppliers
in emerging markets to reduce labor costs. As was the case with
“developed” countries decades ago, regulation or enforcement of
facility safety and worker training are often lacking in emerging
markets. Thus, a ﬁrm's response to stakeholder concerns is
informed by the regulatory context facing their suppliers
(Campbell, 2007). Multinational buyers in emerging economics are
sometimes forced to play the role occupied by regulators in
developed economies, thereby ﬁlling a key ‘regulatory gap’. Second,
similar to the broad-scale quality movement in supply chain
management, buyers often have limited ability to directly examine
suppliers' internal systems and processes. Buyer auditing and cer-
tiﬁcations (such as ISO 9001) become an indirect means to ﬁll or
surpass any regulatory gap.
Even though stakeholder management is viewed as important
for implementing socially sustainable practices in supply chains
(Zorzini et al., 2015), only a few studies directly considerstakeholders' social responsibility or social sustainability concerns.
One example is a survey of sourcing managers at US apparel and
footwear companies. Park-Poaps and Rees (2010) found pressure
from industry peers and media are signiﬁcantly related to collab-
orative inter-organizational management of labor issues in the
supply chain, but regulation was not signiﬁcantly related to either
internal direction or external partnerships. Another study, by
Ehrgott et al. (2011) used survey data from purchasing managers at
US and German corporations. They empirically tested how pres-
sures from customers, the government, and employees determine
the extent to which ﬁrms consider social aspects when selecting
emerging economy suppliers. Their ﬁndings suggest that middle-
level supply managers as internal stakeholders play a major role
in driving ﬁrms' socially sustainable supplier selection. Both these
studies focus on the views of western managers: they do not
incorporate the perspective of suppliers or other key stakeholders.
Tsoi (2010) collected data from academics, auditing ﬁrms, multi-
national ﬁrms, NGOs, supply chain consultancies, unions and in-
dustry associations in Hong Kong and mainland China to identify
local and regional supply chain stakeholders’ perceptions and ex-
pectations. The study found Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
matters to largely export-oriented businesses. But, as in the pre-
vious studies, the views of the emerging market suppliers ewhere
social sustainability is needed most e were missing.
To date, the literature is only starting to develop an under-
standing about how stakeholders hinder or enable capabilities that
enable more sustainable supply chains. Recently, Gualandris et al.
(2015), by integrating sustainable SCM and accounting literature,
conceptualized that stakeholders can play four roles (i.e., observer,
coordinator, counsellor, or partner) as a focal ﬁrm develops evalu-
ation and veriﬁcation capabilities. Others such as Zorzini et al.
(2015) have pointed out that empirical studies having a multi-
stakeholder perspective on social sustainability in the context of
dyadic relationships between buyers and suppliers are rare.
Therefore, the topic of how stakeholder pressures affect the
development of buyer and supplier SMCs in emerging markets is of
strong academic and practical relevance.
2.1.1. Key stakeholders in the clothing industry
In the clothing industry, anecdotal evidence in the media and
earlier research point to ﬁve major stakeholders beyond traditional
supply chain members (i.e., buyers, suppliers and consumers).
These ﬁve major stakeholders include: media, NGOs, unions, in-
dustry associations and regulatory agencies. All of them struggle to
deﬁne the target level of social performance and how best to ach-
ieve it. To that end, buyer pressure continues to be one of the pri-
mary factors spurring improvement (Luken and Stares, 2005; Yu,
2008), often with speciﬁc socially sustainable practices as pre-
conditions to obtaining buyer orders. The media plays an impor-
tant role as a watchdog by monitoring and reporting on social
failures (De Brito et al., 2008; Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010). Negative
media coverage has sensitized consumers, who in turn demand
that multinational buyers implement social standards, both in their
own operations and in their suppliers’ operations (Tsoi, 2010;
Ehrgott et al., 2011). As a result, consumers and the media indi-
rectly promote the development of SMCs in buyers and suppliers.
Also, internal stakeholders such as front-line workers and man-
agers can pressure ﬁrms to adopt SMCs (Carter and Jennings, 2004;
Delmas and Toffel, 2004).
NGO reaction to poor working conditions in developing coun-
tries such as Bangladesh is one of the largest factors in advancing
social improvement among suppliers (Mont and Leire, 2009;
Schrader et al., 2012). NGOs can organize public demonstrations,
run media campaigns to generate attention, and shame manage-
ment into correcting social failures (Mamic, 2005; Tsoi, 2010;
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cising their collective bargaining power, can pressure the buyers
and suppliers to ensure social sustainability (Lipschutz, 2004).
Trade bodies can inﬂuence the implementation of social practices
(Hoffman, 2001; Campbell, 2007) by making demands as a condi-
tion of membership and educating member ﬁrms on social issues.
Regulatory agencies in emerging markets use public policy and
regulation to pressure suppliers and multinational buyers to ach-
ieveminimum standards (Lim and Phillips, 2008; Yu, 2008; Lee and
Kim, 2009). However, regulations alone are ineffective unless reg-
ulators actively monitor ﬁrms and subject them to meaningful
enforcement (Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Fox, 2004). With limited
enforcement in emerging countries, many ﬁrms skirt full compli-
ance (Tsoi, 2010; Huq et al., 2014).
2.1.2. Industry-level shocks affecting stakeholder pressures
In stable environments, multinational ﬁrms can take little notice
of the interests of peripheral stakeholders, such as their suppliers'
workers; however, in turbulent environments, such as the after-
math of the Bangladeshi building collapse, these ﬁrms face im-
mediate intense pressure to respond to the interests of all key
stakeholders (Freeman andMcVea, 2001). Industry-level shocks are
difﬁcult to foresee, and they often produce irreversible shifts and a
disruptive impact on organizations (Meyer,1982). An industry-level
shock acts as a catalyst for action, especially if the outcome of the
crisis contrasts sharply with stakeholder expectations and reso-
nates emotionally. Because such a shock can negatively affect many
organizations in the same industry, it can also trigger broad-scale
re-examination of practices and foster the development of new
capabilities and the improvement of existing capabilities. For
example, the 2008 contamination of milk products with melamine
in China, which killed six babies and sickened thousands, led to the
rapid development of international testing standards, food safety
legislation and simple but effective testing capabilities (Montague-
Jones, 2010; Stones, 2010). In this study, we examine how a speciﬁc
industry-level shock prompted dramatic changes in stakeholder
roles and pressure, ultimately developing social management ca-
pabilities (SMCs) in Bangladesh's clothing industry.
2.2. Social management capabilities (SMCs) in emerging markets
Capabilities refer to a ﬁrm's ability that arise from skills, prac-
tices, relationships, and processes; organizational processes are
learned routines that help ﬁrms transform their inputs into outputs
(Winter 2003; Mahmood et al., 2011). According to Parmigiani et al.
(2011), technical and relational capabilities present one typology
for categorizing capabilities related to sustainable supply chain
management. Technical capabilities include understanding the
processes involved in producing and sourcing goods and services
(Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). Technical capabilities support
operational objectives such as cost reduction. Relational capabil-
ities represent a ﬁrm's ability to “design contractual and informal
mechanisms to align incentives, share information, increase
commitment, and generate common goals between the ﬁrm and
other entities” (Parmigiani et al., 2011: p. 214). These capabilities
include supplier evaluation and monitoring (Petersen et al., 2005),
and collaborative supplier development (Krause et al., 1998; Dyer
and Nobeoka, 2000).
Much attention has been devoted to environmental manage-
ment capabilities, which yield greener products and cleaner pro-
cesses (Darnall et al., 2008; Lee and Klassen, 2008), often with the
support of suppliers (e.g., Bowen et al., 2001; Vachon and Klassen,
2006). Recent research has emphasized monitoring, collaboration
and innovation as key capabilities to improve the management of
social issues in the supply chain, similar to those for environmentalmanagement (e.g., Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Marshall et al.,
2014; Yawar and Seuring, 2015). Monitoring, including auditing,
assesses suppliers’ compliance with health and safety re-
quirements. Collaboration encourages suppliers to adopt policies
and procedures related to fair wages, reasonable limits on overtime,
autonomous work practices and effective job design to minimize
stress. Innovation includes capitalizing on new market opportu-
nities, new forms of relationships, or enhanced technical
understanding.
2.2.1. Monitoring capabilities: combining buyer's auditing with
supplier's compliance
Auditing has become a mainstream practice of many multina-
tional buyers when suppliers are located in emerging markets. The
standard against which a buyer might audit suppliers is either an
internally developed code of conduct (CoC) (Lee and Kim, 2009) or
that of a third-party (Gugler and Shi, 2009). A buyer can rely on a
widely adopted certiﬁcation, using third-party accreditation to
legitimize a supplier's reported performance (Ciliberti et al., 2009).
Buyers can enforce adherence to the codes or standards by estab-
lishing compliance as a requirement for securing orders (i.e., order
qualiﬁer), especially if the suppliers are situated in distant coun-
tries where ﬁrsthand observation is difﬁcult (Ehrgott et al., 2011).
The process for conducting supplier audits can be carried out
using three general approaches, each requiring different skills and
practices. First, the buyer's own internal staff can conduct the au-
dits. Second, a subcontracted third-party might perform the audit
and prepare a report (Mamic, 2005; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006).
The use of third-party auditors is widely acknowledged to be more
competent, credible and transparent than a buyer's own audit
(Graaﬂand, 2002; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). Third, a supplier
might also undertake an audit of its own operations using a third-
party, often to demonstrate compliance with a recognized accred-
itation, and thereby attract and retain buyers (e.g., Fairtrade).
Little attention has been given to what skills and practices the
supplier must have to comply with local regulations, international
certiﬁcations or consumer expectations of social performance.
Zorzini et al. (2015) question whether CoCs and third-party certi-
ﬁcations from developed economies can be effectively imple-
mented in emerging markets with different cultural and socio-
economic values. Auditing can be perceived by suppliers as a co-
ercive demand from buyers, with little incentive to move beyond
“window dressing.” Furthermore, little research is available on the
effectiveness of audits (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014).
Collectively, these factors can encourage suppliers to act decep-
tively by, for example, keeping double books. And the net result is
symbolic or superﬁcial compliance (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010;
Huq et al., 2014). Further research is needed to understand the
implications of auditing social performance (Yawar and Seuring,
2015), considering both the type of auditor, and how a more sub-
stantive level of compliance could be developed. Buyers' auditing
practices cannot be considered in isolation: one must consider the
combination of buyer audit capabilities and supplier compliance
capabilities. This combination allows buyers and suppliers to avoid
stakeholder criticism and legitimize suppliers’ efforts to improve
socially sustainable performance.
2.2.2. Collaboration capabilities
For social issues, collaboration capabilities consist of skills and
practices that improve the ﬁrm's coordination with its suppliers,
consumers and other stakeholders to jointly improve social out-
comes (De Bakker and Nijhof, 2002). Collaboration also emphasizes
the value of building suppliers' or buyers' own capabilities rather
than focusing only on short-term beneﬁts (Vachon and Klassen,
2006; Pagell and Wu, 2009). Collaboration between buyers and
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structural and strategic. Operational collaboration improves
transaction efﬁciency and information exchange. Structural
collaboration relies on standardized systems geared toward process
integration. Strategic collaboration involves tackling shared objec-
tives and may expand to partnership and joint problem-solving
beyond market-based contracting (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).
Similar to monitoring capabilities, much of the literature em-
phasizes collaborative capabilities focused on environmental as-
pects (e.g. Vachon and Klassen, 2006). In the social sustainability
area, Ciliberti et al. (2008) identify capability building as a key
strategy for transferring socially sustainable behavior across the
supply chain. This approach is also discussed by Andersen and
Skjoett-Larsen (2009) and involves building the supplier's own
social capabilities, for example, by promoting a socially responsible
culture among suppliers. However, research to date has focused
little attention on collaboration with multiple stakeholders,
including NGOs, international development agencies, and trade
bodies, to name several (Barnett et al., 2015; Zorzini et al., 2015).
2.2.3. Innovation capabilities
Innovation has emerged as a potentially important capability to
build new customer markets and reduce costs through better
managing social aspects of the supply chain (Pagell and Wu, 2009).
Innovation capabilities are deﬁned as skills, relationships and
processes that yield newmarkets, build newmanagement systems,
and generate new performance outcomes or reduced social risks. A
key distinction between collaboration and innovation is that the
former focuses on coordinating and executing previously estab-
lished products, systems and performance standards, while the
latter produces new opportunities, management systems and per-
formance outcomes and is more radical in nature (Peng et al., 2008;
Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). In their empirical study, Klassen and
Vereecke (2012) found that a food and beverage manufacturer
developed deep relationships with two of its buyers (retail chains)
and a European government agency to jointly develop several
projects in Latin America focused on social development, local
education and rainforest protection. As a result, new worker skills
were developed in Latin American communities and geographic
regions were set aside to conserve biodiversity. Their study also
suggests that a degree of inter-ﬁrm collaboration is needed to
develop innovation capabilities in the supply chain where working
with new or existing stakeholders produces creative social perfor-
mance outcomes.
In summary, previous research on the social capabilities of
monitoring, collaboration and innovation has emphasized a buyer's
perspective in a developed market, rather than a supplier's
perspective. In addition, much remains to be explored about the
objectives, processes and roles that a broader set of stakeholders,
including NGOs, unions and trade bodies, might play in developing
these capabilities in suppliers in emerging markets.
2.3. Social performance
Unlike environmental performance, which often can be clearly
deﬁned and assessed against an objective standard (e.g., quantity of
a pollutant emitted), the scope of social performance in a supply
chain is deﬁned by current societal expectations and can change
dramatically over time (Martin, 2002). Child labor was not un-
common in developed countries in the late 19th century but is now
considered unacceptable. Expectations for “reasonable” working
hours per week have changed in recent decades. In the face of this
ambiguity about scope, it is helpful to consider two broad di-
mensions of social performance: (a) internal social performance,
which includes labor practices related to employment equity andworker rights; safety and healthcare; and quality of life; and (b)
external social performance, which includes community develop-
ment; reduction in risks of social failures; and inclusion of
marginalized stakeholders (Carter and Jennings, 2002; Carter,
2004; Hutchins and Sutherland, 2008; Zorzini et al., 2015).
Worker rights and employment equity encompass the use of child
or forced labor, disciplinary practices and working hours (Luken
and Stares, 2005; Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010). Safety and
healthcare refers to the provision of safe working conditions, use of
protective equipment, and employee safety training (e.g. Hutchins
and Sutherland, 2008; Bai and Sarkis, 2010). Community develop-
ment involves improving the general welfare of communities in
which the ﬁrm operates; it might involve expanding the use of local
suppliers to increase local employment, purchasing materials and
services from minority-owned businesses, or using Fair Trade
products to help alleviate poverty (Carter, 2000; Tate et al., 2010).
Because social performance is rarely absolute, it must be gauged
against current stakeholder expectations for each speciﬁc perfor-
mance dimension (Martin, 2002). Thus, one can point to at least
four relative levels of performance: aspirational, where an organi-
zation meets stakeholders' highest goal; effective, where an orga-
nization performs substantively above minimum baseline
requirements, but below world-class standards; minimum accept-
able, where the organization only meets the lowest levels allowed
by a baseline standard; and unacceptable, where the organization
fails to meet a baseline standard. The baseline standard might be
deﬁned by the maximum of local regulations, customer expecta-
tions, a buyer's CoC. Suppliers with the lowest level of social per-
formance create risk for themselves, for peers and for downstream
supply chain partners. Fig.1 summarizes our conceptual framework
of how stakeholder pressure leads to the development of SMCs,
which in turn foster internal and external social performance to
varying degrees.
3. Research design
Our empirical study draws from our synthesis of prior literature
to explore critical factors that inﬂuence the development of SMCs in
an emerging market context. Our two-period analysis also enables
an investigation into the evolution of SMCs during a tumultuous
period of intense stakeholder pressure on Bangladesh's clothing
industry. This development and evolution of capabilities were our
initial focus, as these were identiﬁed as a critical precursor to any
performance outcomes (Fig. 1). In addition, the measurement
challenges related to assessing social performance in an emerging
market only allowed limited inference from relationships, pro-
cesses and practices. Thus, the main focus of this research was on
SMCs and stakeholder pressure.
3.1. Multiple case studies
The infancy of social sustainability research calls for an
exploratory approach to our investigation of SMCs. An exploratory
approach is appropriate when a phenomenon is at a develop-
mental stage and constructs are yet to be clearly identiﬁed and
delineated (Voss et al., 2002; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin,
2009). We used the case study research method for three reasons.
First, case studies allow for the thorough examination of complex
real-life issues and provide greater depth of insights, enabling
researchers to build inductive theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner,
2007; Yin, 2009). Second, the ﬂexibility of a case study
approach allows access to ﬁrms at different positions in a supply
chain and enables the gathering of rich data through interviews,
observation and document analysis: this rich data permits cross-
validation (Creswell, 1998; Seuring, 2008). Third, longitudinal
Fig. 1. Framework of social management capabilities.
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management for observing sequential relationships of events
(Voss et al., 2002) and the evolution of an organizational phe-
nomenon over time (Pettigrew, 1990). The examination of
sequential events over time provides a dynamic dimension to
theory-building (Wacker, 1998).
Multiple case studies offer the researcher a deeper under-
standing of processes and a better picture of “locally grounded
causality” than do single case studies. They enhance the external
validity of ﬁndings, reduce researcher bias (Eisenhardt and
Graebner, 2007; Barratt et al., 2011), and support the creation of a
more robust theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This study
includes 18 case studies: seven multinational buyers and 11 Ban-
gladeshi suppliers. The ﬁrm was the primary unit of analysis, with
each having a clear supply chain role (i.e., buyer or supplier).
Wherever possible, we sought out dyads and interviewed both the
multinational buyer and one of its emerging market suppliers. Of
the 18 case studies conducted, 15 ﬁrms (83%) were members of a
dyad. (see Tables 1 and 2). The core set of 18 cases were supple-
mented by interview data from other key stakeholders, including
workers, unions, trade bodies and NGOs. Thus, the data collection
considered not only the ﬁrm's capabilities, but also its interactions
with multiple stakeholders.
3.2. Research context
We focused on a single industry e the Bangladeshi clothingTable 1
Proﬁles of western Buyer organizations.
Organization
features
Size (approx.) Key suppliers I
Buyer 1 >$10 billion Suppliers 4, 5 & 10. C
S
C
Buyer 2 $5e10 billion Suppliers 3, 4 & 5 H
Buyer 3 $3e5 billion Supplier 5 C
Buyer 4 >$20 billion Suppliers 2, 6, 5, 11 & 12 L
S
Buyer 5 >$20 billion Suppliers 6, 7 & 11 C
Buyer 6 >$20 billion Suppliers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 12 S
Buyer 7 $3e5 billion N/A C
M
Total interviewsindustry e to control for confounding factors such as economic
conditions and regulations. Bangladesh, identiﬁed as one of the
Next-11 emerging markets by Goldman-Sachs (2013), exported
$24.5 billion worth of clothing in 2013e14 e placing them second
only to China for clothing exports (BGMEA, 2015). The country was
ranked the top future sourcing destination by chief purchasing of-
ﬁcers at US and European retailers (McKinsey, 2015). The sector's
economic performance is set against a challenging backdrop: 32%
of the population lives in poverty, with a daily income of less than
$2 (World Bank, 2014), and the industry's minimummonthly wage,
at $68, is the lowest in the world (Wall Street Journal, 2013). Social
conditions in the labor-intensive clothing sector have been the
subject of public scrutiny, partly due to recent deadly incidents,
including the Tazreen factory ﬁre in 2012 and the Rana Plaza
collapse in 2013. Unfortunately, these tragedies were not isolated
events, as almost 2000 Bangladeshi clothing workers have died in
industrial incidents since 2005 (CNN, 2013). This industry provided
a rich, dynamic setting for our ﬁeld research and offered potential
for important insights into the development of SMCs in multina-
tional buyers and emerging market suppliers.
3.3. Data collection and analysis
We used semi-structured interview protocols (Yin, 2009). They
allowed us the ﬂexibility to probe participants for detail and
enabled a freer discussion of sensitive topics while ensuring the
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Proﬁles of Bangladeshi supplier organizations.
Organization Size (employees) Key buyers Interviewee(s) Period 1: Pre-Rana Plaza collapse Period 2: Post-Rana Plaza collapse
Supplier 1 700 Buyer 6 Managing Director ✓ ✓
Executive Director ✓ ✓
HR & Compliance Manager ✓
Director ✓
Supplier 2 1500 Buyers 4 & 6 Managing Director ✓
Deputy Managing Director ✓ ✓
HR Manager ✓
Supplier 3 2400 Buyer 2 & 6 Group HR Manager ✓
Compliance Manager ✓
Supplier 4 7000 Buyer 1, 2 & 6 Managing Director ✓
Chief Operating Ofﬁcer ✓
Compliance Manager ✓
Supplier 5 1400 Buyer 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 Chairman ✓
CEO ✓
HR & Compliance Manager ✓
Supplier 6 700 Buyer 4 & 5 Director ✓ ✓
Supplier 7 3000 Buyer 5 Chairman ✓
Director (Merchandising); ✓ ✓
HR Manager ✓
Supplier 8 5000 N/A Deputy Managing Director ✓
Compliance Manager ✓
Supplier 9 1000 N/A Managing Director ✓
Compliance Ofﬁcer ✓
Supplier 10 17,000 Buyer 1 Head of Sustainability ✓ ✓
Distribution Executive ✓
Supplier 11 22,000 Buyer 4 & 6 Director ✓
Total Interviews 25 7
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terviews were conducted with key industry actors, including
buyers, suppliers and other stakeholders. In addition, two focus
group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with clothing industry
workers with a total of 21 participants. We supplemented the in-
terviews with factory site visits for all the suppliers and, where
allowed, took pictures and notes. Additionally, multiple sources of
secondary data, including ﬁrms' CoCs, audit reports and news ar-
ticles, were used to triangulate and support interview data and also
protect against researcher bias. All 11 Bangladeshi suppliers export
to Europe and North America. The seven buyers are major North
American and European clothing retailers sourcing from
Bangladesh, with 2013 clothing sales ranging from $3 billion to
more than $20 billion (Tables 1 and 2). European and North
American buyers were chosen because more than 85% of Bangla-
desh's clothing exports go to these two regions (BGMEA, 2015).
Other stakeholders interviewed (see Table 3) includedworkers, one
local NGO, one international NGO, two labor unions, managers and
staff from one international and one local chamber of commerce
and the Bangladeshi clothing trade body.
All interviews for both periods were transcribed and then coded
using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 10. This left an
audit trail of interview transcripts and tracked how analysis was
conducted using codes and memos. A ﬂexible coding process was
followed, initially using codes derived from semi-structured inter-
view protocol and the literature review, adding inductive codes as
the analysis continued (Salda~na, 2013). The initial codes captured
broad themes such as buyer auditing and monitoring capabilities
and supplier compliance capabilities, problems faced during the
implementation process and outcomes perceived. Such descriptive
ﬁrst-cycle coding helped initially summarize segments of data from
the transcripts (Miles et al., 2014). First-cycle coding was followed
by second-cycle coding, which involved developing inferential,
pattern codes that capture emergent themes (Miles et al., 2014).
Interview transcripts were analyzed in waves, case study after
case study, as part of within-case analysis. This wave analysis was
followed by a cross-case analysis, where the researchers looked forthemes that cut across the case studies. For example, patterns we
found in the levels of capabilities among buyers and suppliers led
us to rate the level of each SMC as low, medium, or high (Tables 4
and 5). Two researchers independently assessed the levels of
SMCs based on the data collected from interviews, site visits and
document reviews. This independent assessment produced an
inter-rater reliability of 84% (Voss et al., 2002). The relatively small
number of disagreements were resolved by the two raters going
back to the data and discussing it. Finally, a third researcher
reviewed the framework and a sample of the assessments. The
perspectives of buyers and suppliers were also compared during
cross-case analysis, and two researchers who conducted the ﬁeld
work jointly carried out the cross-case analysis to improve reli-
ability (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein,1999;Miles et al., 2014). The
entire research team then reviewed the ﬁnal results. The measures
taken to establish rigor in this study help ensure conﬁdence in our
ﬁndings.3.3.1. Unexpected opportunity: pre- and post-shock data collection
and analysis
The unforeseen tragedy on April 2013 allowed us to probe how
SMCs evolve in response to a dramatic increase in stakeholder
pressure. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Yin (2009) are
proponents of this kind of controlled opportunism, especially when
it leads to new theoretical insights. We had already collected data
before the Rana Plaza collapse: 47 interviews in Period 1 (2011e13).
We collected additional data after the Rana Plaza collapse: a further
16 interviews in Period 2 (2013e15) (see Tables 1e3.) The data
collection design during Period 2 was emergent: it was dependent
upon thewillingness of ﬁrms to continue participating in our study.
In the aftermath of the collapse, participants became more reluc-
tant to share sensitive information. However, our ﬁnal sample
remained balanced, with four of the original seven multinational
buyers and ﬁve of the original 11 suppliers being interviewed in
Period 2. The two-period analysis provides a range of capability
development, as detailed in Section 4.
Table 3
Proﬁles of stakeholders.




















N/A One of the premier local NGOs in the
country addressing issues of workers'
rights and responsibilities and is
particularly devoted to undertake
welfare activities for destitute and
neglected women, children, elderly and
disabled workers working in formal and
informal sectors. Collaboration with
Buyer 7 and Supplier 10.
Chairwoman ✓ ✓
General Secretary ✓




N/A An international NGO, with a presence
in 70 countries and experience of
working in Bangladesh for 60 years
promoting sustainable development
models to empower and beneﬁt the
poorest and marginalized. They have
projects collaborating with factory
management and international buyers
to develop life & leadership skills for
workers (mainly female) and thereby
improving their human and social
position. Collaboration with Buyer 6.
Manager ✓
Labor Union 1 >80,000 members Looking after the interest of workers
including labor rights and better living
and working conditions.
President ✓ ✓
General Secretary ✓ ✓
Labor Union 2 >11,000 members Looking after the interest of workers







Not available To promote economic cooperation
between the United States of America
and the People's Republic of
Bangladesh, particularly in the private
sector.
President ✓





>4000 member factories The apex trade body that represents the
export oriented woven, knit and
sweater garment manufacturers and
exporters of the country. Works with
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In this section, we summarize our ﬁndings across the cases for
the seven multinational buyers (US and EU) and 11 emerging
market suppliers (Bangladeshi). The basic constructs deﬁned
earlier in the literature review were used to structure these ﬁnd-
ings, and we begin with observations of the buyers' SMCs (4.1),
followed by the suppliers’ SMCs (4.2). In Section 5, we develop a set
of propositions that emerge from this ﬁeld work and consider the
impact an industry-level shock- and its resulting stakeholder
pressure e have on the evolution of SMCs in both buyers and their
suppliers.
4.1. Differing levels of capabilities
To ensure consistency in the data from each buyer and supplier,
we built a structured assessment framework to evaluate each ﬁrm's
SMCs. Drawing on the structure identiﬁed by prior literature, we
rated buyers on their auditing (i.e., monitoring), collaboration and
innovation capabilities (Table 4). While supplier capabilities forcollaboration and innovation are similar, the counterpoint to the
buyer's auditing capability e from the audit target's perspective e
is the supplier's compliance capability (Table 5). All seven buyers
and 11 suppliers were rated on each capability using a straight-
forward three-point scale (Table 6, Period 1). As an overall measure
of the level of SMC development, the average of the three di-
mensions was computed to characterize each ﬁrm as having high
(>2.5), medium (1.5e2.5) or low (<1.5) level of overall SMC
(Table 6). While more precision might be theoretically possible, this
scale provided a reasonable representation given the nature of our
interviews and data collection. Overall, it is important to note that
buyers and suppliers had a diverse set of capabilities, although the
media and NGO attention tended to highlight primarily those ﬁrms
with poor capabilities.
4.2. Monitoring
4.2.1. Buyer audit capabilities
Stakeholders including the media, multinational consumers,
NGOs and unions have applied pressure on multinational buyers to
Table 4
Assessment guidelines for BUYERS’ social management capabilities.
Capability High (3) Medium (2) Low (1)
Auditing  Complete integration of suppliers'
social sustainability performance in
SCM procedures
 Requires that suppliers follow
stringent, transparent and
comprehensive social standards and
participate in supplier development
activities
 Dedicated staff/department dealing
with implementation of socially
sustainable practices
 Periodic training and education of
staff covering a wide range of social
issues




 Requires suppliers to comply with
local laws, plus ﬁrms own CoC or
third party certiﬁcations
 Limited dedicated staff/department
dealing with implementation of
socially sustainable practices
 Intermittent training or education of
staff on social issues
 Limited consideration of suppliers'
social performance and assessment
mainly through basic policing
activities
 Requires compliance only with local
laws
 No dedicated staff/department
dealing with implementation of
socially sustainable practices e
auditing/monitoring mainly through
third party auditors
 No training or education of staff on
social issues
Collaboration  Proactive collaboration with other
stakeholders
 Provide suppliers with a wide range
of in-depth managerial and tech-
nical assistance for implementation
 Evidence of limited cooperation with
other stakeholders
 Provide suppliers with a limited
managerial and technical assistance
for implementation
 No cooperation with stakeholders
 Does not provide suppliers with any
managerial and technical assistance
for implementation
Innovation  Leadership in implementing social
sustainability initiatives by proactive
and continuous development of new
and more effective implementation
tools, procedures and programs
 Irregular development of new and
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were in place (International Labor Rights Forum, 2012). The scope
and depth of these capabilities were driven, in large part, by pro-
cesses for conducting an audit. Multiple approaches were evident
in Bangladesh, and the initiating party for the audit was viewed as
the key differentiator, and the form of the audit was subsequently
categorized as (1) supplier-arranged audit, or (2) buyer-directed
audit. It should be stressed that the form of the audit is not the
same as audit capabilities.
A supplier-arranged audit was undertaken to respond to de-
mands by one or more buyers for a particular order-qualifying
certiﬁcation (Fig. 2, upper pathway). In Bangladesh, the most
common were Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production
(WRAP), typically for the North American market, and Business
Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) or Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS)
for the European market. These certiﬁcation audits typically
involved reviewing the supplier's labor practices, including com-
pany policies, working hours and documents regarding labor con-
tracts, and inspecting working conditions, including health andTable 5
Assessment guidelines for SUPPLIERS’ social management capabilities.
Capability High (3) Medium (
Compliance  Going over and beyond industry
social standards and participation in
supplier development programs
 Complete compliance in any
circumstances
 Dedicated staff/department dealing
with implementation of socially
sustainable practices
 Periodic training and education of
















Innovation  Leadership in implementing social
sustainability initiatives by proactive
and continuous development of new





programsafety issues. For example, on the day of the audit, the auditors
would select factory workers at random and privately interview
them about ill-treatment at work, on-time payment of salaries and
overtime wages and provision of medical beneﬁts. If minor viola-
tions were detected, suppliers were allowed between three and six
months to correct them. Suppliers only failed if major violations
were apparent, such as child or forced labor. Seven of 11 suppliers
used a supplier-arranged audit (Table 6) to meet buyer demands.
Buyer-directed audits (Fig. 2, lower pathway) that enforce a
buyer's CoC were further subdivided based on who performed the
assessment: (2a) a third-party auditor; or (2b) the buyer's auditor
(i.e., internal audit team). Third-party auditors (2a) provide an
arms-length credibility that is more difﬁcult to achieve with a
buyer's own audit team. In our study, two of the seven buyers used
a third-party auditor. Five buyers used their own audit teams,
which they believed could better adapt to their speciﬁc concerns.
Using an internal audit team enabled the ﬁve buyers to better un-
derstand a given supplier's limitations and helped grow bilateral
trust over time.2) Low (1)
ance with local laws, plus
own CoC or third party
tions





ttent training or education of
social issues
 Compliance only with local laws
 Symbolic compliance in regular
circumstances
 No qualiﬁed/specialized staff dealing
with implementation of socially
sustainable practices
 No training or education of staff on
social issues
e of limited collaboration
her stakeholders
 No cooperation with stakeholders






Social management capability development in buyers and suppliers.
Firm Period 1 Period 2
Auditing Collaboration Innovation Overall Audit Type Auditing Audit Type
Buyer 1 3 3 3 3.0 2b - 3a
Buyer 2 2 2 1 1.7 2b 3 3a
Buyer 3 3 2 2 2.3 2b 3 2b
Buyer 4 3 3 3 3.0 2b - 3a
Buyer 5 2 2 1 1.7 2b - 3a
Buyer 6 1 2 1 1.3 2a 3 3b
Buyer 7 1 3 3 2.3 2a 3 3a
Supplier 1 1 1 2 1.3 1, 2a 1 1
Supplier 2 2 1 2 1.7 2a, 2b 3 3a + 3b
Supplier 3 2 1 1 1.3 2a, 2b - -
Supplier 4 2 3 1 2.0 1, 2a, 2b - -
Supplier 5 2 1 2 1.7 2a - -
Supplier 6 1 1 1 1.0 1 2 3a
Supplier 7 2 2 1 1.7 1, 2a, 2b 3 3a + 3b
Supplier 8 2 1 1 1.3 1, 2a, 2b - -
Supplier 9 2 1 1 1.3 2b - -
Supplier 10 3 3 3 3.0 1, 2a, 2b 3 3a
Supplier 11 3 2 3 2.7 1, 2a, 2b - -
Notes:
To indicate overall development of Social Management Capabilities, the average was calculated for each ϐirm, and rated
as high (> 2.5), medium (1.5 -2.5), and low (<1.5). 
Audit Type:
1. supplier- arranged
2a. buyer-directed audit: third-party auditor
2b. buyer-directed, buyer auditor
3a. buyer-consortium - Accord
3b. buyer-consortium – Alliance
(-) = No Data
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were notable in one additional aspect: sustainability was more
deeply embedded in their ﬁrm culture. These ﬁrms employed
dedicated personnel who actively sought to develop social man-
agement capabilities in their suppliers. Outcomes included broader
training for and improvement initiatives with their suppliers, in
order to improve supplier compliance processes. As discussed later,
these initiatives could foster other new collaborative or innovative
capabilities in suppliers that improved compliance.
For example, Buyer 1 had an actively managed sustainability
strategy across its supply chain, with the stated goal of becoming
‘the world's most sustainable major retailer by 2015’. This buyer
gave employees regular training; had a strong internal code of
ethics; and used cross-functional teams to undertake
sustainability-related initiatives. “Our compliance team goes to our
[European] head ofﬁce or the India regional ofﬁce to get training.
Sometimes consultants come from abroad to train us and show us
examples and videos of best practices. We focus on internal develop-
ment and then we are trying to develop the supplier externally”
(Supply Chain Manager of Buyer 1). The Head of Sustainability for
Supplier 10, a supplier to Buyer 1, concurred: “[Buyer 1], who has
their own internal sustainability program, cares about the sustain-
ability of their suppliers. Conversely, those buyers who don't have in-
ternal programs don't care about their suppliers.”
4.2.2. Supplier compliance capabilities
Driven by many social failures in the Bangladeshi clothing in-
dustry over the last decade (e.g., Spectrum factory collapse in 2005
killed 63 people, and the Hameem factory ﬁre in 2010 killed 29
people), buyer pressure on suppliers to comply with the buyer's
CoC or other social standards became an order qualiﬁer forsuppliers. Moreover, given that suppliers conduct business with
multiple buyers, it was not surprising that eight of our 11 partici-
pating suppliers reported being subjected to multiple forms of
audits. In addition to the added compliance burden, confusion can
result from trying to comply with each CoC. Thus, we observed a
wide variety of supplier compliance capabilities evolve in response
to two major pathways in Fig. 2, i.e., supplier-arranged audits and
buyer-directed audits.
Demonstrating compliance to supplier-arranged and buyer-
directed third-party audits mainly focused on the documentation
(Fig. 2, upper-right) of particular practices (e.g., training) or out-
comes (e.g., number of worker overtime hours). Suppliers were
given time to rectify minor violations, but if they were found to be
consistently non-compliant, buyers terminated the contract. In
general, suppliers also had to demonstrate adherence to speciﬁc
guidelines relating to child labor, forced labor, discrimination,
health and safety, freedom of association, right to collective bar-
gaining, disciplinary practices, working hours and remuneration.
Another aspect of supplier-arranged or buyer-directed third-
party audits was the tendency toward ‘symbolic compliance’ by
suppliers (Fig. 2), also termed ‘window dressing’ (Oliver, 1991),
which involved concealing nonconformance to social expectations.
For example, local law limited the maximum overtime for the
Bangladeshi suppliers that we studied to two hours per day.
However, to meet very short delivery timelines, many suppliers
required workers to work additional overtime. The managers of a
majority of the suppliers interviewed divulged that they kept two
sets of records e the falsiﬁed set that were shown to auditors, and
the real set that were used to determine worker pay. This symbolic
adjustment (hiding/duplicating records) was reported as being an
important skill of the compliance manager - “the cleverer you are,
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evidence they cannot really penalize us” (HR manager of Supplier 4).
The HR Manager of Supplier 4 admitted his factory held the gold
certiﬁcate in WRAP, despite regularly violating the limit on
overtime.
Another example: local law states that if a factory employs more
than 300 workers, it must have an equipped dispensary with a
patient room, doctor and nursing staff. But our ﬁndings revealed
that some buyers allowed their suppliers to pass their audit even if
they had just a nurse present (Supplier 2). The ComplianceManager
of Supplier 1 admitted their doctor is only present when there is an
audit. Finally, the ComplianceManager of Supplier 8 remarked: “We
do a lot of things just for show. For example, only if there is an
announced audit dowe tell the workers responsible for ﬁreﬁghting and
ﬁrst aid to wear their uniforms and proper safety gear.”
To varying degrees, as a result of supplier-arranged or buyer-
directed third-party audits, suppliers started providing workers
with basic training and education (Fig. 2). In many cases, the edu-
cation substituted for the limited presence of unions (Bangladesh
law limits unions with complicated procedures). For example, some
suppliers provided education to workers about their employment
rights, described a buyer's CoC, offered a service handbook, and
delivered counseling. Auditors could then conﬁrm through private
interviews of the supplier's employees their level of awareness ofFig. 2. Framework of Audit and Compliancelocal labor laws, e.g. employee rights for maternity leave, a pay slip,
and sick leave. This further promoted worker awareness of their
rights. According to HR Manager, Supplier 1: “Five years ago, the
workers didn't even know what is basic salary or overtime, but now
the situation has turned positive drastically.”
Buyer-directed audits (see Fig. 2, lower pathway) led to similar
standards of documentation as supplier-arranged or buyer-directed
third-party audits. In addition, direct involvement and pressure
from buyers prompted suppliers to offer broader training and ed-
ucation for workers. For example, several suppliers trained workers
for health and safety committees and ﬁreﬁghting. This training
opened the lines of communication with management, as workers
could now voice their concerns more effectively. At least one sup-
plier went notably further. Supplier 10 was the most proactive and
was the only supplier to establish a separate sustainability
department, conduct worker orientation programs and build in-
ternal development programs for mid-level managers: “We train
our HR personnel, which is called ‘Training of Trainers’ so that they in
turn can train the workers. At the moment we have 39 types of training
that is provided to our employees” (Supplier 10, Head of
Sustainability).
Another distinction of buyer audits was the potential for
signiﬁcantly increased scope and depth of dialog between buyers
and suppliers, leading to improvement in supplier complianceCapabilities e Pre Rana Plaza Collapse.
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observed: “We changed the concept of audit to diagnosis. Just like
when a person goes to the doctor, the doctor diagnoses the problem
and provides solutions. Similarly, we ﬁnd the problems and then help
the suppliers overcome them. After diagnosis, we ask the suppliers to
rank, according to them, the difﬁculty of solving these problems. For
example, one supplier said that to get rid of child labor for him is easy
but to overcome working-hour violation is difﬁcult. So we work with
them to solve the more difﬁcult problems. We provide them consul-
tation free of cost, and the end-results show how many times we have
visited the supplier, what has been the percentage of issues resolved
and how has their social audit score improved. … we are doing this
with 11 of our suppliers.” Thus, a thoughtful, well-executed buyer
audit (2b) also fostered the development of collaborative capabil-
ities, discussed next.
4.3. Collaboration capabilities
Recall that collaboration involves skills, processes and practices
that improve a ﬁrm's coordination with its suppliers, consumers
and other stakeholders to jointly improve social outcomes (De
Bakker and Nijhof, 2002). The focus can be operational (geared
towards improving transaction efﬁciency), structural (relying on
systems to integrate processes), or strategic (setting and achieving
shared objectives) (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).
Among the buyers, those with low or medium level of SMCs
revealed little evidence of collaboration (Table 6). However, the
buyers with high overall SMCs offered several interesting examples
of more substantive dialog between buyers and suppliers (Fig. 2,
lower-right). Buyer 1 teamed up with a local NGO, who provided
vocational support to train disabled people. After receiving training,
these workers found employment with Buyer 1's suppliers. Sup-
pliers 4 and 10 (both supplied Buyer 1) had participated in this
training program. At the time of the interview, Supplier 10 had
employed 46 disabled workers. Buyer 1 understood it lacked the
requisite capabilities and needed to collaborate with a local NGO to
generate positive outcomes such as employment for disadvantaged
workers.
Buyer 4 had a dedicated sustainability department, which un-
dertook various social projects in collaboration with NGOs: “We
have set up training centers for adolescents in areas where there is
a concentration of clothing workers. We need local input and can't
do it alone, which is why we partner with local NGOs (Sustain-
ability Manager, Buyer 4).” Thus, collaboration could take place
between triads (Buyer-NGO-Suppliers) - as in the disabled worker
training example e and between non-traditional dyads (Buyer-
NGO) - as in the child labor example.
4.4. Innovation capabilities
In contrast to collaboration, which focuses on improving coor-
dination, innovation emphasizes new skills and radical changes in
processes and outputs to yield new markets, build new manage-
ment systems, and generate new performance outcomes or reduce
social risks (Peng et al., 2008; Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). Inno-
vation turned out to be a much richer area thanwe anticipated; our
ﬁndings suggest buyers and suppliers can leverage innovation ca-
pabilities to ﬁll regulatory gaps in emerging markets. These inno-
vation capabilities for the social bottom line are often not required
in developed countries with stringent regulations.
4.4.1. Buyer innovation
Buyers with high SMCs had innovation capabilities that helped
them implement social practices in new and creative ways. Buyer 1
used non-ﬁnancial incentives to improve social sustainability in itssuppliers: the ﬁrm gave annual awards to suppliers that best
contributed to its sustainability strategy. Supplier 10, which had a
high level of overall SMC, supplying to Buyer 1, won this award and
was building the ﬁrst green factory in Bangladesh. In order to
encourage this supplier further, the Country Manager of Buyer 1
pre-booked capacity in this factory. This manager also stressed that,
because of Buyer 1's size and reputation, suppliers who complied
with its social standards would beneﬁt indirectly (i.e., spillover
effects) by getting orders from other buyers.
Another buyer with high SMCs, Buyer 4, headed a collaborative
project with other buyers and the Clothing Trade Body to make an
informational ﬁlm about ﬁre safety before (!) the widely covered
Tazreen ﬁre killed more than 100 workers in 2012. Buyer 4 had
instructed its suppliers to show this ﬁlm in their factories and train
the workers. Here, the key innovative element was working with
competitors to improve the speciﬁc social processes of their col-
lective supply base. Buyer 4 also tried to improve suppliers’ eco-
nomic viability by providing training to increase productivity, even
if competitors potentially beneﬁtted.
Buyer 4 also moved beyond just social criteria in an effort to
address one or more underlying causes. For example, short delivery
timelines, combined with limited capacity, forces suppliers to use
excessive overtime. Buyer 4 extended their audit to include sup-
pliers’ capacity planning, a key operations improvement (Fig. 2,
lower-right). This extended scope helped prevent suppliers from
taking on more orders than they could handle, which they typically
subcontracted to questionable suppliers. This innovative action on
the part of Buyer 4 was prescient, as subcontracting proved to be a
key supply chain problem linking major buyers like Benetton and
Wal-Mart (unknowingly) to unaudited suppliers with poor social
performance. Rather than simply blame middlemen and suppliers
for subcontracting to non-compliant factories, Buyer 4 proactively
mitigated such risks by prompting improvement.
Buyer 7, with medium level of SMCs, was carrying out a number
of unique social initiatives in conjunction with stakeholders. They
worked with NGO 1 and one of its suppliers to educate female
workers about reproductive health, family planning, and personal
care through a series of in-factory educational sessions (85% of the
workers in the Bangladeshi clothing sector are women). This
project ﬁlled an important knowledge gap among female factory
workers, and the local partner provided expertise, contextual
sensitivity, and cultural understanding to train a group of female
workers, who in turn educated peers in the factory. The objective
was to shift from health professionals toward peer-to-peer diffu-
sion, using co-workers who share similar social backgrounds and
life experiences. Buyer 7's Corporate Sustainability Manager re-
ported that the participating supplier beneﬁtted from less health-
related absenteeism, lower staff turnover, and hence increased
productivity. Buyer 7 worked with three other buyers (i.e., com-
petitors), an international NGO, a local NGO and a donor agency to
provide skill development for adolescents (16e18 years), who le-
gally cannot work full-time. Underprivileged teens were trained in
sewing, quality control or mechanics, and they were later offered
the opportunity to work as apprentices for three months at one of
Buyer 7's supplier factories. Buyer 7 had well-developed collabo-
ration capabilities that facilitated innovation.
4.4.2. Supplier innovation capabilities
For suppliers, innovation and operations improvement
appeared across several fronts, including ﬁre safety, self-
assessment, and waste recycling. After the Tazreen ﬁre (2012),
Supplier 10 started conducting ﬁre drills on a bi-monthly basis with
innovative adjustments to improve worker understanding, plant
design, and ultimately, survival rates. “In the ﬁre drills, we change
variables, e.g. if one exit is blocked, what will be the alternate plan of
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them much freer so that evacuation can take place within ﬁve mi-
nutes.” This approach at Supplier 10 contrasted sharply with other
suppliers who did not want to disrupt production to train workers
on ﬁre safety. Its Distribution Executive believed innovations such
as assembly re-arrangement in the name of ﬁre safety could pro-
vide a competitive advantage: “Because of Tazreen, there is a chance
that our orders will increase. Our social standards are up to the mark
and now buyers are looking to place orders in more compliant fac-
tories. Nowwe have an opportunity to capture these buyers.” Supplier
10 also supported workers by paying as much as 20% more than the
industry average and establishing aworker's welfare funde both of
which improved proﬁtability. “One tangible result of our social sus-
tainability initiatives was the decrease in labor turnover,” according to
the Head of Sustainability.
Supplier 10 further described how its innovation capabilities
helped generate higher proﬁts. “We are a member of Fair Labor
Association (FLA) … We saw that when we say to our customers,
like Buyer 1, that we are a member of FLA, we can ask for higher
prices. As a result, we are getting better margins, increased volume
and it is also helping us attract customers. We can get the orders for
high-end products, where the proﬁt margin is higher.” The Country
Head for Buyer 1 observed: “Because they [Supplier 10] are sus-
tainable, they do not have to do any marketing [to obtain orders].”
Unlike any other supplier in our sample, Supplier 11 conducted a
self-assessment using third-party auditors to gauge and develop its
own SMCs. The Director of Supplier 11 explained: “This is very
important, otherwise you don't know where you are. You should not
wait for a buyer to audit you.” Again, such innovations attracted
better buyers, who offered higher prices for socially sustainable
factories, yielding greater proﬁts for the suppliers.
However, even those suppliers with medium or low levels of
SMCs showed some inclination toward innovative capabilities,
again often tied to improving morale, decreasing turnover, and
ultimately improving productivity. For example, Supplier 2 (me-
dium overall SMC) sold waste fabric to local recyclers, who created
low-grade fabric for stufﬁng mattresses and pillows. Supplier 2
then used the funds from this environmental initiative to set up a
workers’ welfare fund, thereby combining environmental and so-
cial objectives. Supplier 1, with low SMC score, arranged for hep-
atitis C tests for its workers, as water borne diseases are common in
Bangladesh. The Managing Director explained: “You would be sur-
prised that from around 700 workers tested, 28 had this disease. We
told them that we will pay for your treatment up front, and deduct the
due amount on a monthly basis.” This inexpensive testing and
treatment increased worker morale and loyalty and eventually
decreased worker turnover.
4.5. Post-Rana Plaza disaster, 2013e2015 (period 2)
The collapse of the Rana Plaza building put Bangladesh's
economically successful clothing industry in a harsh international
spotlight, highlighting chronic social failures in worker health and
safety. Fortunately, two members of the research team were gran-
ted follow-up interviews with two suppliers with low, two with
medium, and one with high overall SMC scores. Also, four buyers
agreed to be interviewed after the collapse: one had low, two had
medium, and one high had overall SMC scores (Table 6). Collec-
tively, this second set of interviews allowed us to examine changes
in themonitoring (audit and compliance) capabilities for the buyers
and suppliers, respectively. Our interviews did not reveal any sig-
niﬁcant shifts in collaboration or innovation capabilities in the two-
year period following the disaster.
The Rana Plaza disaster prompted individual multinational
buyers to drastically enhance their auditing SMC. For example, bothBuyers 2 and 6, possessing medium and low levels of SMCs pre-
Rana, respectively, greatly expanded efforts to educate and train
managers, staff and workers. Buyer 6 also restructured its audit
department: they doubled staff, hiring a ﬁre safety specialist and
structural engineers, and they renamed the department the
“Responsible Sourcing Department.” With much higher audit
standards, almost 30% of Buyer 3's suppliers were deemed non-
compliant.
More broadly, following the Rana Plaza collapse, buyers, reg-
ulators, trade bodies, NGOs and unions began joint initiatives to
improve the industry's social standards. One of these joint initia-
tives produced a new form of audit e termed a buyer-consortium
audit. An example of a buyer-consortium audit was the
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety. It included 190
(mostly European) buyers covering 1700 suppliers, who worked
with global and local unions supported by NGOs. The other buyer-
consortium example was an international framework called the
Alliance for BangladeshWorker Safety, which brought together 26
North American clothing brands and trade bodies covering
approximately 700 suppliers. The two buyer consortiums audited
ﬁre, electrical and structural safety with similar standards. How-
ever, differences emerged for audit ﬁnancing, accountability and
legal liability (Jopson et al., 2014). Accordmembers co-signed their
agreement with unions, who can challenge the companies when
they fail to fulﬁll their commitments. In contrast, the Alliance has
no union signatories. For suppliers not covered by either the
Alliance or the Accord, the Bangladeshi government and repre-
sentatives of Bangladesh employers' and workers' organizations
agreed to audit those suppliers under the Tripartite National Ac-
tion Plan.
Six of the seven buyers from our initial case studies joined either
the Accord or the Alliance (Table 6). Only Buyer 3 did not join either
buyer consortium, partly because it already had a well-developed
audit capability. For example, Buyer 3 was conducting ﬁre and
electrical safety audits using external consultants in Period 1, when
other buyers were not. Also, Buyer 3 had a concentrated sourcing
strategy, with roughly $200 million spread across a small supply
base (fewer than 10 suppliers), each of whom demonstrated a high
level of compliance. Buyer 3 believed any potential incremental
gains from joining a buyer consortium would be more than offset
by potential incremental costs. Instead, Buyer 3 simply added
structural audits to its existing protocols. Supplier 1 could not meet
either the Accord or the Alliance standard. Since buyers would not
place orders with suppliers that failed to meet the standards,
Supplier 1 was in the process of closing during Period 2.
Buyers noticed the dramatic changes. At Buyer 2, the Head of
Compliance described the situation: “The suppliers' backs are
against thewall now, since the buyers are putting pressure on them
together. For example, if Accord ﬁnds that a supplier needs to
improve ten things, but the supplier only does nine of them, then
they cannot work with any of the Accord buyers. Plus, the unions
will then pull out their workers from this unsafe supplier's factory.”
These buyer-consortium audits were different from previous
types of audits in four major ways. As before, datawas gathered and
checked by third-party auditors, but they now reported to the
consortium (Fig. 3). Much like the other forms of audits mentioned
previously, documentation was essential but the level of veriﬁca-
tion was much higher (Fig. 3, upper-right). According to the Di-
rector of Supplier 6: “The positive side of this audit is that it is actually
working. You cannot [window dress] here as before. I think it is more
effective since we are not paying for these audits. If I would have paid
for the audit, then they [the auditors] would have been biased towards
me and given me certain lee-way. Since [the auditors] are funded by
the buyers, they are more loyal to buyers than the supplier… Accord is
very picky about the documents and along with that they are cross-
Fig. 3. Framework of buyer-consortium audit and supplier compliance capabilities e post Rana Plaza collapse.
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when they are cross-checking the genuineness of the documents, it
becomes very difﬁcult to hide.”
Second, reporting of buyer-consortium audits was transparent,
as it was now available online to relevant stakeholders (Fig. 3). As
the Deputy Managing Director of Supplier 2 explained: “The depth
and thoroughness of the audits has increased. There is now no chance
of carrying out ’mock’ compliance. It is very genuine now. The greatest
difference between the past and present is that your audit now is a
publicly available document.” The Director of Supplier 7 concurred:
“The buyers are uploading the audit reports on their web site. This is a
problem for the supplier as everyone can see it, including prospective
new customers. It is mainly because of this fear that most suppliers are
trying to be compliant. Before, the ﬁndings remained between the
buyer and supplier. But now it is available in the public domain. Ev-
eryone's dirty laundry is all over the internet!”
Third, broad stakeholder involvement was foundational to the
buyer consortia (Fig. 3). Buyers, government agencies, trade bodies,
NGOs and unions participated in developing the standards from the
outset. Fourth, buyer consortia pay signiﬁcant attention to
increasing education and training that expand workers' and man-
agers' health and safety skills (Fig. 3). The Deputy Managing Di-
rector at Supplier 2 reported: “[The] Alliance, along with some NGOs
and the Fire Department, are giving the workers ﬁre safety training.
This is very important. In fact, we were ourselves shocked by how little
our workers know. This was a real eye opener for us. They come with
iPads and give the workers multiple choice exams… They tested all the
workers in groups of 50 and shared the results with us. We were
alarmed, as our HR department was supposed to be ‘training’ our
workers. We found that our training was not at all effective and it was
not communicated well.”With the buyer consortia, suppliers were forced to invest heavily
in facility infrastructure assessment and improvement (Fig. 3). For
example, the structural integrity of their factories was examined,
and ﬁre safety measures like sprinklers, ﬁre doors, and smoke
alarms were installed. The Managing Director of Supplier 1 sum-
marized the broad-scale effect of these changes: “The whole concept
of worker safety, welfare, and well-being has changed in the industry
after Rana Plaza … The compliance issues are being strictly enforced.
The buyers now have zero tolerance for violation in terms of ﬁre safety
and building structure … and those suppliers who will not meet these
criteria will not be able to survive.”5. Discussion: theorizing the development of SMCs in
emerging economies
Our ﬁeld research provided an empirical basis for detailing how
three basic social management capabilities e monitoring, collabo-
ration and innovation e were implemented and leveraged in sup-
ply chains that link developed and emerging markets. The
ﬁeldwork supported the critical ﬁnding that monitoring is not
monolithic. Instead, it involves a complex interplay between two
sets of capabilities: buyer's auditing capabilities and supplier's
compliance capabilities. Our case studies unpack the implications
of buyers' different forms of auditing and their linkages to sup-
pliers' compliance processes e both before and after an industry
shock. Emergingmarket suppliers demonstrated both collaborative
and innovative SMCs. This section will offer research propositions
derived from our case research.
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In Period 1, supplier-arranged audits strengthened supplier
legitimacy with developed market buyers in complex emerging
market supply chains. This emphasis was consistent with the
perceived pressure from stakeholders (before the disaster) to
identify best practice and reward this as a competitive advantage.
In contrast, after the disaster, stakeholders were exerting great
pressure on all ﬁrms, regardless of size, to improve their level of
social performance and ensure that a minimum acceptable level of
performance is achieved consistently (Fig. 3). Despite difﬁculty
obtaining direct objective data on social performance, our obser-
vations indicated that performancewas intertwinedwith the audit/
compliance, collaboration and innovation processes. In the section
that follows, our ﬁeld work is synthesized to develop initial prop-
ositions related to the development of capabilities, as well as ex-
pected social performance, to lay the groundwork for additional
theorizing and future empirical study.
Evidence showed that third-party audits can lead to an
improvement in documentation processes because data (such as
records of overtime wage payment) were collected, recorded and
compiled to support audit ﬁndings. Unfortunately, many suppliers
had unacceptable social practices (e.g. hiding/duplicating overtime
records), indicating that third-party audits were only producing
symbolic compliance (Fig. 2). No evidence was found that supplier-
arranged audits exceeded minimum expectations, and certainly
many examples were identiﬁed with unacceptable practices. In
contrast, the response of suppliers to buyer-directed audits had
much greater variance; some suppliers still demonstrated evidence
of symbolic compliance, but others had made or were making
substantive operational improvements to their social practices.
From our ﬁeld data, symbolic compliance occurred most often
when audits were conducted by a third-party ﬁrm, regardless of
whether the third-party audit was supplier-arranged or buyer-
directed. In general, managers at suppliers felt third-party audi-
tors were more distrustful of the supplier than buyer auditors. The
suppliers described these relationships as mostly adversarial e
perhaps because the supplier and auditor lacked shared objectives.
P1. The likelihood of an emerging market supplier's social compli-
ance processes being largely symbolic increases with multinational
ﬁrms' use of third-party auditors resulting in poorer social
performance.
In contrast, suppliers perceived buyers’ own audit teams to be
more understanding, possibly because viewed as an incentive to
develop reliable, long-term partnerships. As discussed in Section
4.2.2, managers at both buyers and suppliers reported that when
buyers use their own audit team, results included broader training
and education for workers and substantive dialog with suppliers. Of
greatest interest, innovative approaches to auditing can yield
improved supplier compliance processes and better social perfor-
mance, such as transitioning from auditing to diagnosis prompted
better capacity planning and reduced worker overtime.
P2. With an objective of diagnosis, the use of a multinational buyer's
own audit team improves emerging market suppliers' social compli-
ance performance through more extensive worker training and edu-
cation, substantive dialog, and operational improvement.
Why do buyers use third-party auditors rather than their own
audit teams? Because buyers rationalize that third-party audits
provide credibility, offer potential economies of scale, or have
greater skills. Yet, given that buyers who hadmedium or high SMCs
tended to use their own auditors (Table 6), our evidence suggested
that the last two reasons were the most critical. Those with highSMCs also had sustainability more deeply embedded in their ﬁrms’
own cultures (Marshall et al., 2015). For example, Buyer 1 was
fostering a culture of sustainability with an internal code of ethics
and regular employee training on sustainability issues. In contrast,
those buyers with low levels of SMCs viewed sustainability trans-
actionally, and outsourced to “efﬁcient” external auditors. Thus,
credibility appears to be a secondary consideration.
These ﬁndings extend previous research on developing supplier
capabilities, such as the implementation of quality management
systems (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2002). More speciﬁcally, outsourcing
supplier auditing to third parties might make more sense in
developed markets, where regulators develop and enforce a social
norms consistent with customer expectations. Thus, buyer-directed
audits using internal audit teams might yield stronger compliance
capabilities, but like quality management, internal audit teams vary
widely in their effectiveness. Therefore, using a buyer's own audit
team could be a necessary but insufﬁcient condition for a supplier
to develop better compliance capabilities.
5.1.1. Buyer-consortium audits
Like other operations or supply chain capabilities, one can
expect economies of scale for SMCs. Buyer-consortium audits
provide a means to expand both the depth and scope of buyer audit
capabilities. As Section 4.5 (Fig. 3) explained, buyer-consortium
audits improved the depth of audit and compliance capabilities
with improved veriﬁcation; increased transparency; broad stake-
holder engagement; increased worker and management education
and training; and facility infrastructure assessment and improve-
ment. Input from NGOs and other experts extended the scope of
buyer audit capabilities by addressing issues previously overlooked
or ignored, such as the structural integrity of factories, in addition
to the standard ﬁre safety, electrical and working conditions.
In developed countries, many social concerns are under the
purview of regulators. Emerging economies may have similar reg-
ulations but lack enforcement. In the case of the Bangladeshi
clothing industry, a regulatory gap clearly existed: “The main pres-
sure was from the buyers, or else it [compliance] never would have
happened. The labor laws are there but not strictly implemented, and
you could circumvent them” (Supplier 1, Managing Director); and:
“The government enforcement of [regulations] should be more. If the
buyers were not enforcing it, then no one would have adhered to the
social standards” (Buyer 1, Compliance Manager).
Lack of resources is one reason for weak enforcement. “There is
also a shortage of manpower. The Chief Inspector of Factories is
responsible for implementing the labor law, but all over Bangladesh
he has only 54 inspectors [to inspect approximately 4000 sup-
pliers]” (Labor Union 2, President). The HR Manager of Supplier 5
offered scathing criticism of government regulators: “The labor
ministry audit is not effective… An inspector came a few days back
and he asked for some data, but actually he just wanted his bribe
amount. If it is left to the government to implement social stan-
dards it will NEVER happen!” Buyers have been forced to ﬁll the
regulatory gap created by corruption, poor infrastructure and
limited enforcement through other means, such as the buyer-
consortium audit, which improves social performance.
P3. As scope and depth of regulatory gaps in emerging economies
increase (e.g. lack of legal enforcement, poor infrastructure and limited
resources), multinational buyers must increasingly develop new
shared capabilities (e.g. buyer consortium audit) when working with
suppliers to improve social performance.
The buyer consortium distributes the economic, technical, and
accountability burdens of auditing across multiple stakeholders.
Because the stakeholder group includes competitors, one implica-
tion of the buyer consortium is the commoditization of SMCs for
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industry might result in little competitive advantage. Moreover, the
use of an Accord or Alliance third-party auditor can reduce in-
centives to build trust between the buyer and supplier. Instead, the
approach of Buyer 3 e which built deep internal expertise, worked
proactively with emerging market suppliers, and developed in-
sights into why suppliers operate as they do e can yield a differ-
ential supply chain advantage.
P4. As SMCs are commoditized through buyer-consortium audits,
supplier compliance processes become more standardized, thereby
reducing the potential for a competitive advantage of buyers and
suppliers.5.2. Evolution of SMCs in emerging markets
From our analysis of capabilities in Section 4, we described how
stakeholder pressure played an important role in developing SMCs.
The media, NGOs and customers applied enormous pressure on
buyers, who in turn pressured suppliers. However, two linkages
emerged with important implications: the multiple roles of
stakeholder pressure in developing SMCs; and the complex web of
interactions resulting from an industry-level shock.
5.2.1. Multiple roles of stakeholder pressure in developing SMCs
Unlike developed countries, where governments pressure
buyers and suppliers to be socially sustainable, Bangladesh showed
little evidence of similar pressure in the clothing industry. More-
over, the situation with union and trade body stakeholders was
complex. One trade body represented more than 4000 of the
country's export-oriented woven, knit and sweater garment man-
ufacturers and exporters. In some ways, the trade body played a
positive role, as described by suppliers: “The Clothing Trade Body is
very serious about social compliance” (Managing Director, Supplier
1); and, “… has brought the smaller non-compliant factories within a
framework, as there is a minimum compliance requirement that
members have to adhere to” (Director, Supplier 11). The organization
had auditing teams who inspected factories for compliance and
took action against deﬁcient factories (signiﬁcant violations could
lead to loss of membership). According to their Vice-President, the
Clothing Trade Bodywas asking buyers to be stricter, and not to give
orders to those suppliers that did not have adequate social stan-
dards. However, the Clothing Trade Body had its detractors among
the workers, who felt it was a rich and inﬂuential organization
serving only the interests of its members (i.e., the factory owners).
Workers complained that the Clothing Trade Body did not consider
worker welfare broadly and that it made repeated attempts to keep
the minimum wage at a very low level (FGD 1). The General Sec-
retary of Labor Union 1 conﬁrmed the workers' views, saying: “The
Clothing Trade Body is two-faced. When they talk to the media they
show that they care about the workers. But when they go to the
government for negotiations [about minimum wage], their main
objective is to give less to the workers.”
Other researchers have observed that the effectiveness of
stakeholder pressure varies based on the saliency of the stake-
holder group (e.g., Meixell and Luoma, 2015). Trade bodies are
usually considered important proponents of social sustainability
(Campbell, 2007). Furthermore, some researchers suggest that
pressure from trade bodies and governments prompts deeper SMCs
(e.g., Hoffman, 2001; Lim and Phillips, 2008; Lee and Kim, 2009).
However, our ﬁndings indicate that the same stakeholder might be
positive for some social issues (such as safety) and negative for
others (such as working hours). This conﬂicting pressure attenuates
potential action by either buyers or suppliers to invest in SMCs,
leading to the following proposition:P5. As stakeholder pressures outside the supply chain become
increasingly ambiguous or conﬂicting, the development of SMCs slows
in multinational buyers and emerging market suppliers.5.2.2. Severity of industry-level shock
As with other capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), the development
and evolution of SMCs is path dependent on prior capabilities,
management initiatives and external factors. As time passes, one
might expect ﬁrms to develop distinct competitive strengths, at
least one of which would derive from superior social performance.
However, amajor industry-level shock brought enormous attention
by many stakeholders on several speciﬁc regulatory gaps among
suppliers in Bangladesh. As a result, multinational buyers (and the
emergent buyer-consortium) stepped in to raise the baseline social
performance of the entire industry to better align with rising social
expectations (thankfully!). Doing so shifted efforts, at least in the
short term, from a slow-paced, multi-pronged development of
auditing, collaboration and innovation to an accelerated, unidi-
mensional focus on auditing. In parallel, emerging market suppliers
single-mindedly focused on compliance. This observation extends
recent work on Event System Theory, where events change not only
internal systems and processes, but also industry-wide cooperative
behaviors (Morgeson et al., 2015). Clearly, this shock changed the
trajectory and competitive nature of SMCs for both buyers and their
suppliers.
What is less clear is what happens to ﬁrms that previously
leveraged unique strengths (i.e., differences) in SMCs to carve out a
strong competitive space in operations and supply chain manage-
ment. One can speculate that industry-level shocks erode the value
of strategic strengths, thereby attenuating any competitive advan-
tage (Hart, 1995; Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). Our two-period
analysis illustrated that a severe industry-level shock shifted the
industry from a few ﬁrms gaining competitive advantage via SMC
development, towards co-creating value for the entire industry
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). An industry-level shock disrupted the
natural trajectory of capability development (Belussi and Sedita,
2009), leading to the following propositions:
P6a. A severe industry-level shock in an emerging market recali-
brates the social expectations of stakeholders, thereby prioritizing and
narrowing the scope of capability development.
P6b. A severe industry-level shock in an emerging market reduces
variance in social compliance processes, increases the likelihood of
value co-creation, and attenuates the competitive advantage of lead-
ing buyers and suppliers.5.3. Summary of theoretical contributions
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, based on a
synthesis of prior literature, we identify SMCs that potentially link
multinational buyers and emerging market suppliers. This set of
capabilities is then developed further based on our extensive
ﬁeldwork with multinational buyer and emerging market supplier
organizations in Bangladesh. For example, buyer and supplier ca-
pabilities for collaboration and innovation were analogous and
could be considered somewhat independently. However, buyer
audit capabilities and supplier compliance capabilities were quite
distinct, and needed to be considered in combination. In essence,
what emerged was a reﬁned understanding of a core construct,
monitoring, which previously has been viewed primarily from the
buyer's perspective. The counterpoint to the buyer's auditing
capability e as viewed from the perspective of the audited target
ﬁrm e is the supplier's compliance capability.
Second, our data gathered over ﬁve years (pre- and post-
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followed the shock of a large-scale disaster. This shock offered a
nuanced characterization and understanding of how speciﬁc ca-
pabilities evolve, which understandably might be quite different
than that which occurs during times of gradual stakeholder pres-
sure, or times of stasis. Most researchers presume that sudden
environmental changes place organizations in jeopardy, but our
ﬁeld observations indicate that sudden shocks can also beneﬁt the
entire industry. For example, before the disaster, ﬁrm-directed
audits were individual capabilities; however, the disaster promp-
ted the development of shared (joint) auditing capabilities through
buyer consortium audits, which in turn, yielded improved social
performance. Thus, the immediate, high social cost of the disaster
triggered unprecedented stakeholder pressure, which facilitated
cooperative, industry-level social changes in the apparel industry.
As a result, ﬁrms with low- or medium-level SMCs were motivated
or coerced into quickly developing greater SMCs. Lastly, by inte-
grating prior theory with our ﬁeld data, we derived research
propositions to guide future research in emerging markets.
6. Conclusions
The development of SMCs involves uncertainty and ambiguity,
and continues to present challenges for many multinational ﬁrms
and their suppliers. Although scholars of operations and supply
chain management actively research sustainability concerns, pre-
vious work has emphasized the environmental, rather than the
social bottom line (Moxham and Kauppi, 2014; Zorzini et al., 2015).
In response to calls for better understanding social sustainability in
complex global supply chains, this research explores the develop-
ment of social management capabilities in emerging market sup-
pliers. Of greatest note, we consider the perspectives of multiple
stakeholders, including buyer and supplier views (Jiang, 2009;
Ehrgott et al., 2011; Zorzini et al., 2015), as well as NGOs, trade
bodies and unions. Moreover, the unexpected disaster in Rana Plaza
offered the (unfortunate) opportunity to explicitly capture the
evolution of SMCs over time within the supply chain (Klassen and
Vereecke, 2012).
Complementing others’ earlier research, our ﬁndings empiri-
cally demonstrate how changes in stakeholder pressures after a
major industry shock affect the development of SMCs. More spe-
ciﬁcally, our ﬁndings show that severe industry-level shocks can
recalibrate stakeholder expectations and prioritize the develop-
ment of speciﬁc capabilities. The resulting horizontal collaboration
between competing multinational buyers can help ﬁll critical reg-
ulatory gaps. However, even this apparent progress is not without
challenges, as these positive social changes can commoditize some
SMCs across competitors, reducing former competitive advantages
(Ramaswamy and Gouillart, 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011).
Another novel ﬁnding was the double-edged nature of certain
stakeholder pressures. On the one hand, the data indicated that
emerging market suppliers viewed the role of the Clothing Trade
Body positively. On the other hand, multiple stakeholders, such as
the workers and unions, asserted that the trade body played a
duplicitous role: protecting the interests of its primary members
(i.e., suppliers) and only considering the welfare of supplier
workers when their interests aligned. This ﬁnding of duplicitous
behavior contrasts with earlier research, in which trade bodies are
usually considered important proponents of social sustainability
(Hoffman, 2001; Campbell, 2007). Similarly, the government's role
in devising and enforcing regulations has been highlighted as an
important driver of social sustainability (Lim and Phillips, 2008;
Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010). Here too, our ﬁndings reveal a
more complex set of trade-offs in an emerging market like
Bangladesh. Multinational ﬁrms increasingly have to develop new,shared, capabilities with their suppliers because corrupt govern-
ment inspectors, poor infrastructure, and limited and insufﬁcient
resources for enforcement create regulatory gaps.
6.1. Managerial implications
This paper provides managers of multinational ﬁrms with
guidance about how to characterize and encourage the develop-
ment of SMCs within their own organizations, in their emerging
market suppliers, and where necessary, cooperatively with com-
petitors. By highlighting developing economies’ unique character-
istics, such as regulatory gaps, this study offers more nuanced
insight into how and why multinational ﬁrms must proactively
develop their own SMCs. Waiting for an external disaster, even one
that does not directly involve their own suppliers, has negative
ramiﬁcations for all buyers, including industry leaders. Moreover,
the preemptive, cooperative development of auditing and compli-
ance capabilities e ideally, involving competitors, trade bodies,
NGOs and regulators e can signiﬁcantly increase social perfor-
mance. Developing the capabilities can also lay the groundwork for
more complex capabilities, such as collaboration and innovation, if
the buyer is actively involved in auditing its supplier. Transactional
approaches, such as hiring a third-party to certify compliance,
offered little potential for competitive advantage and little poten-
tial for developing SMCs in emerging market suppliers.
In terms of overall competitiveness, suppliers with higher levels
of SMCs reported economic beneﬁts in the form of increased pro-
ductivity, better prices and increased orders. This ﬁnding supports
efforts by managers in emerging market suppliers to invest in
developing collaborative and innovative SMCs, with the aim of
gaining a competitive advantage. Finally, it is clear that neither
regulators nor buyers need to operate in separate, isolated realms.
Instead, in combination with knowledgeable, local NGOs, they can
leverage each other's expertise to help buyers make more informed
decisions with suppliers and help regulators focus on the highest
risk areas. Our study suggests that these actions have promise for
improving worker safety and welfare.
6.2. Limitations and future research directions
This study is an initial response to the demand for more
empirical research on the social aspect of sustainability, with an
explicit focus on the perspective of suppliers in emerging markets.
As this study focused on only one industry in one country, more
work is needed to understand how well the results might translate
to other emerging markets and industries, such as Vietnam or
Cambodia (clothing) and Ghana (chocolate). Future research must
also consider multiple pathways that enable higher levels of
collaboration and innovation capabilities in emerging market
suppliers. Additional insights and some differences might be ex-
pected from higher-margin manufactured goods, such as portable
electronics. An interesting question in that case is: Which social
management capabilities are most important for buyers such as
Apple, Dell and Sony inworking with supply chain partners such as
Foxconn in China? This supplier suffered intense public scrutiny
after a number of workers committed suicide, reportedly because
of poor working conditions (Reuters, 2010).
The development of SMCs becomes less certain when supply
chains are only in place for a short-to medium-term project, such as
construction. For instance, Qatar has been heavily criticized for the
appalling working conditions of migrant workers involved in con-
struction ahead of the 2022 FIFAWorld Cup. The claims against the
country include unpaid wages, illegal salary deductions, crowded
and unsanitary labor camps, unsafe working conditions and forced
labor (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The propositions derived from
F.A. Huq et al. / Journal of Operations Management 46 (2016) 19e3736this study could provide the basis for further inductive theory
development and empirical conﬁrmation. Finally, although signif-
icant efforts were made towards theory building, more research
must account for the complexities of multi-stakeholder perspec-
tives. Further study is needed of the evolving supply chain roles and
resilience of key stakeholders, e.g. NGOs, consultants and donor
agencies, when faced with unstable environments or their own
economic constraints.References
Andersen, M., Skjoett-Larsen, T., 2009. Corporate social responsibility in global
supply chains. Supply Chain Manag. An Int. J. 14 (2), 75e86.
Awaysheh, A., Klassen, R.D., 2010. The impact of supply chain structure on the use of
supplier socially responsible practices. Int. J. Operations Prod. Manag. 30 (12),
1246e1268.
Bai, C., Sarkis, J., 2010. Integrating sustainability into supplier selection with grey
system and rough set methodologies. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 124 (1), 252e264.
Barnett, M.L., Darnall, N., Husted, B.W., 2015. Sustainability strategy in constrained
economic times. Long. Range Plan. 48 (2), 63e68.
Barratt, M., Choi, T.Y., Li, M., 2011. Qualitative case studies in operations manage-
ment: trends, research outcomes, and future research implications.
J. Operations Manag. 29 (4), 329e342.
Belussi, F., Sedita, S.R., 2009. Life cycle vs. Multiple path dependency in industrial
districts. Eur. Plan. Stud. 17 (4), 505e528.
Beschorner, T., Müller, M., 2007. Social standards: toward an active ethical
involvement of businesses in developing countries. J. Bus. Ethics 73 (1), 11e20.
BGMEA, 2015. Trade Information available at: http://www.bgmea.com.bd/home/
pages/TradeInformation#.UmxCPPmTiSo (accessed on 08.03.15).
Bowen, F.E., Cousins, P.D., Lamming, R.C., Farukt, A.C., 2001. The role of supply
management capabilities in green supply. Prod. operations Manag. 10 (2),
174e189.
Bridoux, F., Stoelhorst, J.W., 2014. Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: man-
aging stakeholders with heterogeneous motives. Strategic Manag. J. 35 (1),
107e125.
Campbell, J.L., 2007. Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways?
an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility. Acad. Manag. Rev. 32
(3), 946e967.
Carter, C.R., 2000. Precursors of unethical behavior in global supplier management.
J. Supply Chain Manag. 36 (1), 45e56.
Carter, C.R., 2004. Purchasing and social responsibility: a replication and extension.
J. Supply Chain Manag. 40 (4), 4e16.
Carter, C.R., Jennings, M.M., 2002. Logistics social responsibility: an integrative
framework. J. Bus. Logist. 23 (1), 145e180.
Carter, C.R., Jennings, M.M., 2004. The role of purchasing in corporate social re-
sponsibility: a structural equation analysis. J. Bus. Logist. 25 (1), 145e186.
Carter, C.R., Rogers, D.S., 2008. A framework of sustainable supply chain manage-
ment: moving toward new theory. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 38 (5),
360e387.
Ciliberti, F., De Groot, G., De Haan, J., Pontrandolfo, P., 2009. Codes to coordinate
supply chains: SMEs' experiences with SA8000. Supply Chain Manag. An Int. J.
14 (2), 117e127.
Ciliberti, F., Pontrandolfo, P., Scozzi, B., 2008. Investigating corporate social re-
sponsibility in supply chains: a SME perspective. J. Clean. Prod. 16 (15),
1579e1588.
Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013. One Year after Tazreen Fire, the Fight for Justice
Continues available at: http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-releases/2013/
11/21/one-year-after-tazreen-ﬁre-the-ﬁght-for-justice-continues (accessed on
21.10.15).
CNN, 2013. Inside a Bangladesh Garment Factory that Plays by the Rules available
at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/20/world/asia/bangladesh-inside-garment-
factory/ (accessed on 17.08.14).
Creswell, J.W., 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five
Traditions. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Darnall, N., Jolley, G.J., Handﬁeld, R., 2008. Environmental management systems and
green supply chain management: complements for sustainability? Bus. Strategy
Environ. 17 (1), 30e45.
De Bakker, F., Nijhof, A., 2002. Responsible chain management: a capability
assessment framework. Bus. Strategy Environ. 11 (1), 63e75.
De Brito, M.P., Carbone, V., Blanquart, C.M., 2008. Towards a sustainable fashion
retail supply chain in Europe: organisation and performance. Int. J. Prod. Econ.
114 (2), 534e553.
Delmas, M., Toffel, M.W., 2004. Stakeholders and environmental management
practices: an institutional framework. Bus. Strategy Environ. 13 (4), 209e222.
Dyer, J., Nobeoka, K., 2002. Creating and managing a high performance knowledge-
sharing network: the Toyota case. Strategic Manag. J. 21 (3), 45e367.
Dyer, J.H., Nobeoka, K., 2000. Creating and managing a high-performance knowl-
edge-sharing network: the Toyota case. Strategic Manag. J. 21 (3), 345e367.
Ehrgott, M., Reimann, F., Kaufmann, L., Carter, C.R., 2011. Social sustainability in
selecting emerging economy suppliers. J. Bus. Ethics 98 (1), 99e119.
Eisenhardt, K.M., Graebner, M.E., 2007. Theory building from cases: opportunitiesand challenges. Acad. Manag. J. 50 (1), 25e32.
Emmelhainz, M.A., Adams, R.J., 1999. The apparel industry response to “sweatshop”
concerns: a review and analysis of codes of conduct. J. Supply Chain Manag. 35
(3), 51e57.
Forbes, 2014. These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have yet to
Compensate Victims available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/
2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have-yet-
to-compensate-victims/ (accessed on 29.10.15).
Fox, T., 2004. Corporate social responsibility and development: in quest of an
agenda. Development 47 (3), 29e36.
Freeman, R., McVea, J., 2001. A stakeholder approach to strategic management. In:
Hitt, M., Freeman, E., Harrison, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management.
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp. 189e207.
Freeman, R.E., 2010. Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Goldman-Sachs, 2013. Goldman Sachs N-11 available at: http://www.
goldmansachs.com/gsam/docs/funds_international/brochures_and_sales_aids/
fund_literature/advisor_brochure_n-11_en.pdf (accessed on 08.03.15).
Graaﬂand, J.J., 2002. Sourcing ethics in the textile sector: the case of C&A. Bus.
Ethics A Eur. Rev. 11 (3), 282e294.
Gualandris, J., Klassen, R.D., Vachon, S., Kalchschmidt, M., 2015. Sustainable evalu-
ation and veriﬁcation in supply chains: aligning and leveraging accountability
to stakeholders. J. Operations Manag. 38, 1e13.
Gugler, P., Shi, J., 2009. Corporate social responsibility for developing country
multinational corporations: lost war in pertaining global competitiveness?
J. Bus. Ethics 87 (1), 3e24.
Harrison, J.S., Bosse, D.A., Phillips, R.A., 2010. Managing for stakeholders, stake-
holder utility functions, and competitive advantage. Strategic Manag. J. 31 (1),
58e74.
Hart, S.L., 1995. A natural resource-based view of the ﬁrm. Acad. Manag. Rev. 20 (4),
986e1014.
Hartmann, J., Moeller, S., 2014. Chain liability in multitier supply chains? Re-
sponsibility attributions for unsustainable supplier behavior. J. Operations
Manag. 32 (5), 281e294.
Helfat, C.E., Raubitschek, R.S., 2000. Product sequencing: Co-evolution of knowl-
edge, capabilities and products. Strategic Manag. J. 21 (10e11), 961e979.
Hoejmose, S., Brammer, S., Millington, A., 2013. An empirical examination of the
relationship between business strategy and socially responsible supply chain
management. Int. J. Operations Prod. Manag. 33 (5), 589e621.
Hoffman, A.J., 2001. Linking organizational and ﬁeld-level analyses: the diffusion of
corporate environmental practice. Organ. Environ. 14 (2), 133e156.
Human Rights Watch, 2012. Qatar: Migrant Construction Workers Face Abuse
available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/12/qatar-migrant-
construction-workers-face-abuse (accessed on 21.08.14).
Huq, F.A., Stevenson, M., Zorzini, M., 2014. Social sustainability in developing
country suppliers: an exploratory study in the ready made garments industry of
Bangladesh. Int. J. Operations Prod. Manag. 34 (5), 610e638.
Hutchins, M.J., Sutherland, J.W., 2008. An exploration of measures of social sus-
tainability and their application to supply chain decisions. J. Clean. Prod. 16 (15),
1688e1698.
International Labor Rights Forum, 2012. Gap, Abercrombie, and JC Penney Lag
behind on Factory Safety Initiatives available at: http://www.laborrights.org/
releases/gap-abercrombie-and-jcpenney-lag-behind-factory-safety-initiatives
(accessed on 27.05.14).
Jiang, B., 2009. The effects of interorganizational governance on supplier's
compliance with SCC: an empirical examination of compliant and non-
compliant suppliers. J. Operations Manag. 27 (4), 267e280.
Jopson, B., Allchin, J., Kazmin, A., 2014. “Rana Plaza Collapse: One Year on”, Financial
Times available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be1a194a-c9ab-11e3-89f8-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz35M6kVsaF (accessed on 01.08.14).
Klassen, R.D., Vereecke, A., 2012. Social issues in supply chains: capabilities link
responsibility, risk (opportunity), and performance. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 140 (1),
103e115.
Krause, D.R., Handﬁeld, R.B., Scannell, T.V., 1998. An empirical investigation of
supplier development: reactive and strategic processes. J. Operations Manag. 17
(1), 39e58.
Lee, K.-H., Kim, J.-W., 2009. Current status of CSR in the realm of supply manage-
ment: the case of the Korean electronics industry. Supply Chain Manag. An Int.
J. 14 (2), 138e148.
Lee, S.-Y., Klassen, R.D., 2008. Drivers and enablers that foster environmental
management capabilities in small- and medium-sized suppliers in supply
chains. Prod. Operations Manag. 17 (6), 573e586.
Lim, S.J., Phillips, J., 2008. Embedding CSR values: the global footwear industry's
evolving governance structure. J. Bus. Ethics 81 (1), 143e156.
Lipschutz, R.D., 2004. Sweating it out: NGO campaigns and trade union empow-
erment. Dev. Pract. 14 (1/2), 197e209.
Luken, R., Stares, R., 2005. Small business responsibility in developing countries: a
threat or an opportunity? Bus. Strategy Environ. 14 (1), 38e53.
Lund-Thomsen, P., Lindgreen, A., 2014. Corporate social responsibility in global
value chains: where are we now and where are we going? J. Bus. Ethics 123 (1),
11e22.
Mahmood, I.P., Zhu, H., Zajac, E.J., 2011. Where can capabilities come from? Network
ties and capability acquisition in business groups. Strategic Manag. J. 32 (8),
820e848.
Mamic, I., 2005. Managing global supply chain: the sports footwear, apparel and
F.A. Huq et al. / Journal of Operations Management 46 (2016) 19e37 37retail sectors. J. Bus. Ethics 59 (1), 81e100.
Marshall, D., Mccarthy, L., Heavey, C., Mcgrath, P., 2014. Environmental and social
supply chain management sustainability practices: construct development and
measurement. Prod. Plan. Control 26 (8), 673e690.
Marshall, D., Mccarthy, L., Mcgrath, P., Claudy, M., 2015. Going above and beyond:
how sustainability culture and entrepreneurial orientation drive social sus-
tainability supply chain practice adoption. Supply Chain Manag. An Int. J. 20 (4),
434e454.
Martin, R.L., 2002. The virtue matrix: calculating the return on corporate re-
sponsibility. Harv. Bus. Rev. 80 (3), 68e75.




Meehan, J., Bryde, D., 2011. Sustainable procurement practice. Bus. Strategy Environ.
20 (2), 94e106.
Meixell, M.J., Luoma, P., 2015. Stakeholder pressure in sustainable supply chain
management: a systematic review. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 45 (1/2),
69e89.
Meixell, M.J., Luoma, P., Saenz, M.J., 2015. Stakeholder pressure in sustainable
supply chain management: a systematic review. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist.
Manag. 45 (1/2).
Meyer, A.D., 1982. Adapting to environmental jolts. Adm. Sci. Q. 27 (4), 515e537.
Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., Salda~na, J., 2014. Qualitative Data Analysis: a Methods
Sourcebook. Sage, London.
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R., Wood, D.J., 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identiﬁ-
cation and salience: deﬁning the principle of who and what really counts. Acad.
Manag. Rev. 22 (4), 853e886.
Mont, O., Leire, C., 2009. Socially responsible purchasing in supply chains: drivers
and barriers in Sweden. Soc. Responsib. J. 5 (3), 388e407.
Montague-Jones, G., 2010. New Test Developed to Detect Melamine in Milk Prod-
ucts available at: http://www.dairyreporter.com/Processing-Packaging/New-
test-developed-to-detect-melamine-in-milk-products (accessed on 21.10.15).
Morgeson, F.P., Mitchell, T.R., Liu, D., 2015. Event system theory: an event-oriented
approach to the organizational sciences. Acad. Manag. Acad. Manag. Rev. 40 (4),
515e537.
Moxham, C., Kauppi, K., 2014. Using organisational theories to further our under-
standing of socially sustainable supply chains: the case of fair trade. Supply
Chain Manag. An Int. J. 19 (4), 413e420.
New York Times, 2013. Bangladesh Factory, Site of Fire that Trapped and Killed 7,
Made European Brands available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/
world/asia/bangladesh-factory-site-of-fatal-ﬁre-made-western-brands.html?
_r¼5& (accessed on 29.10.15).
Oliver, C., 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Acad. Manag. Rev. 16
(1), 145e179.
Pagell, M., Shevchenko, A., 2014. Why research in sustainable supply chain man-
agement should have no future. J. Supply Chain Manag. 50 (1), 44e55.
Pagell, M., Wu, Z., 2009. Building a more complete theory of sustainable supply
chain management using case studies of 10 exemplars. J. Supply Chain Manag.
45 (2), 37e56.
Park-Poaps, H., Rees, K., 2010. Stakeholder forces of socially responsible supply
chain management orientation. J. Bus. Ethics 92 (2), 305e322.
Parmigiani, A., Klassen, R.D., Russo, M.V., 2011. Efﬁciency meets accountability:
performance implications of supply chain conﬁguration, control, and capabil-
ities. J. Operations Manag. 29 (3), 212e223.
Pedersen, E.R., Andersen, M., 2006. Safeguarding corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in global supply chains: how codes of conduct are managed in buyer-
supplier relationships. J. Public Aff. 6 (3e4), 228e240.
Peng, D.X., Schroeder, R.G., Shah, R., 2008. Linking routines to operations capabil-
ities: a new perspective. J. Operations Manag. 26 (6), 730e748.
Petersen, K.J., Handﬁeld, R.B., Ragatz, G.L., 2005. Supplier integration into new
product development: coordinating product, process and supply chain design.
J. Operations Manag. 23 (3e4), 371e388.Pettigrew, A.M., 1990. Longitudinal ﬁeld research on change: theory and practice.
Organ. Sci. 1 (3), 267e292.
Pfeffer, J., 2010. Building sustainable organizations: the human factor. Acad. Manag.
Perspect. 24 (1), 34e45.
Porter, M.E., Kramer, M.R., 2011. The big idea: creating shared value. Harv. Bus. Rev.
89 (1e2), 63e77.
Potter, W., Levine-Donnerstein, D., 1999. Rethinking validity and reliability in con-
tent analysis. J. Appl. Commun. Res. 27 (3), 258e284.
Ramaswamy, V., Gouillart, F., 2010. Building the co-creative enterprise. Harv. Bus.
Rev. 88 (10), 100e109.
Reuters, 2010. Foxconn Worker Plunges to Death at China Plant: Report available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-china-foxconn-death-
idUSTRE6A41M920101105 (accessed on 21.08.14).
Salda~na, J., 2013. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Sage, London.
Schneider, L., Wallenburg, C.M., 2012. Implementing sustainable sourcingdDoes
purchasing need to change? J. Purch. Supply Manag. 18 (4), 243e257.
Schrader, C., Freimann, J., Seuring, S., 2012. Business strategy at the base of the
pyramid. Bus. Strategy Environ. 21 (5), 281e298.
Seuring, S.A., 2008. Assessing the rigor of case study research in supply chain
management. Supply Chain Manag. An Int. J. 13 (2), 128e137.
Snir, E.M., 2001. Liability as a catalyst for product stewardship. Prod. Operations
Manag. 10 (2), 190e206.
Stones, M., 2010. IDF and ISO Develop New Melamine Milk Test Standard available
at: http://www.dairyreporter.com/Processing-Packaging/IDF-and-ISO-develop-
new-melamine-milk-test-standard (accessed on 22.10.15).
Tantalo, C., Priem, R.L., 2016. Value creation through stakeholder synergy. Strategic
Manag. J. 37 (2), 314e329.
Tate, W.L., Ellram, L.M., Kirchoff, J.O.N.F., 2010. Corporate social responsibility re-
ports: a thematic analysis related to supply chain management. J. Supply Chain
Manag. 46 (1), 19e44.
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., Shuen, A., 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic manage-
ment. Strategic Manag. J. 18 (7), 509e533.
Tsoi, J., 2010. Stakeholders' perceptions and future scenarios to improve corporate
social responsibility in Hong Kong and mainland China. J. Bus. Ethics 91 (3),
391e404.
Vachon, S., Klassen, R.D., 2006. Extending green practices across the supply chain:
the impact of upstream and downstream integration. Int. J. Operations Prod.
Manag. 26 (7), 795e821.
Voss, C., Tsikriktsis, N., Frohlich, M., 2002. Case research in operations management.
Int. J. Operations Prod. Manag. 22 (2), 195e219.
Wacker, J., 1998. A deﬁnition of theory: research guidelines for different theory-
building research methods in operations management. J. Operations Manag.
16 (4), 361e385.
Wall Street Journal, 2013. Bangladesh Factory Owners Wary of Wage Increase
available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304579404579235351833424162 (accessed on 12.08.14).
Winter, S.G., 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Manag. J. 24 (10),
991e995.
World Bank, 2014. World Development Indicators available at: http://data.
worldbank.org/country/bangladesh (accessed on 12.08.14).
Yawar, S.A., Seuring, S., 2015. Management of social issues in supply chains: a
literature review exploring social issues, actions and performance outcomes.
J. Bus. Ethics 1e23.
Yin, R., 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage, Thousand Oaks.
Yu, X., 2008. Impacts of corporate code of conduct on labor standards: a case study
of Reebok's athletic footwear supplier factory in China. J. Bus. Ethics 81 (3),
513e529.
Zhu, Q., Sarkis, J., 2007. The moderating effects of institutional pressures on
emergent green supply chain practices and performance. Int. J. Prod. Res. 45
(18/19), 4333e4355.
Zorzini, M., Hendry, L.C., Huq, F.A., Stevenson, M., 2015. Socially responsible
sourcing: reviewing the literature and its use of theory. Int. J. Operations Prod.
Manag. 35 (1), 60e109.
